Nonviolence and the “New Violence”

The Contemporary Reaction Against Nonviolence

The period spanning the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s witnessed an upsurge of physical violence and a proliferation of recommendations to use manifest violence, physical and verbal. It inundated colonial, racial, and educational controversies in Europe, America, India, and many other areas. Sometimes it has been systematically and consistently anti-Gandhian, being in part a direct reaction against the limited success of Gandhian and pseudo-Gandhian preaching and practice.

We shall not enter here into the controversies about the causes of this development, which we vaguely characterize as the “new violence.” A symptom, rather than a cause, is widespread dissatisfaction, indignation, and impatience when considering the slowness of the movement of liberation in the colonial, racial, and educational spheres. The imperatives “Do it quicker!” and “Freedom now!” have testified to this demand for immediate, radical change. The slogan “Revolution!” has invaded all spheres of discussion. Revolution is generally conceived as a violent overthrowing, idealizing “power over” and coercion at the cost of “power to.” Changes should be forced on opponents; agreement and compromise should be shunned. The slogans are sometimes formed consciously so as to be in direct opposition to the preaching of nonviolence.

Young leaders of opinion mostly have no knowledge of the revolutionary aspects of Gandhi’s campaigns. This even seems to hold for Indian leaders. Their image of him is more likely to be of a man concerned with means rather than with ends, more concerned with prevention of open violence than with the elimination of the hidden structural violence built into societies in the form of exploitation. They do not know that Gandhi intended
to make, and in fact made, gigantic efforts to destroy structural violence and that his timetable was that of a revolutionary. This fact is important for assessing the potential that improved information on Gandhi might have in the future—even if it must be admitted that Gandhi did not achieve the rapid changes he envisaged early in his life.

Young people on several continents have joined the reaction against the preaching of consistent nonviolence. It is in many ways a fight against the vast flood of hypocrisy, false idealism, suppressed hatreds, and disguised sadism that masquerade as civility, peacefulness, and tolerance. It is perhaps also part of youth’s painful realization of lack of spontaneity and genuine self-expression. The usual descriptions of Gandhian ideology stress moralism, saintliness, humility, and sacrifice (conventionally interpreted) and neglect the basic norm that you should follow your inner voice whatever the consequences. The distortion has contributed to the neglect of militant nonviolence as a possible way of protest.

The new emphasis on violence is clearly formulated by such leaders and authors as Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, C. V. Hamilton, and Sartre. In what follows, we limit our references to the writings of these men, and in spite of the many differences in their opinions, we shall refer to their strategy of conflict as that of the “New Violence.”

Comparing the Recent Norms of Violence with Those of *Satyagraha*

A comparison of the maxims of contemporary violence-promoting leaders with those of nonviolence suggests that on the metaphysical level, it is not the oneness of all life or of humanity that is stressed, but a Lutheran dichotomy between the good and the bad. Certain groups regarded as comprising the good, brave, honest, and just are contrasted with exploiters, suppressors, liars, and traitors. There is, further, a theory of basic contrasts of interest: “[T]he colonial context is characterized by dichotomy,” Frantz Fanon asserts, and he continues:

The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity . . . they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous. (Fanon 1966: 31)
Power is considered largely to be in the hands of the “bad,” and since violence is taken to be the only adequate means of change, violence is necessary: Self-realization of the “good” group requires using violence against the “bad.” Complete self-realization of the “good” is impossible without violence against the “bad,” and killing does not prevent self-realization of the killer. On the contrary, it helps him. So even if brutality is in some sense “regrettable,” it is morally justified when considered as unavoidable.

From the point of view of Gandhi, the characterization of a human being as (categorically) bad is verbal violence. It denies the possibility of its increasing self-realization and thus justifies its treatment under certain circumstances as a nonliving thing.

As to the possibility of political liberation in the colonies, Fanon holds:

For the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler. (Fanon 1966: 72)

The native . . . is ready for violence at all times. From birth it is clear to him that his narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence. (Ibid., p. 31)

The future society envisaged by the advocates of violence seems, on the other hand, to be one of nonviolence and spontaneous conformity in opinions. (Pluralistic ideals are rare, and it might be asserted that this antipluralism is in its consequence a form of violence if conformity is not spontaneous.) Contemporary advocates of violence, in contrast to Fascist theorists, do not see violent activity as an end, but only or mainly as a means to obtain a new social order characterized by harmony and nonviolence.

The belief in such a transition implies a direct negation of a basic maxim of nonviolence, “The character of the means determines the character of the ends,” or in terms of our systematization, “The character of the means used in a group struggle determines the character of the results.” The “fanonization” of means will fanonize the emerging society. According to some advocates of the New Violence, however, the killer is free when he has killed the opponents. The past killing does not cast any shadow into the future.

Any amount, or a very substantial dose, of violence is consistent with a later realization of nonviolence, according to the principles of the New Vi-
violence, and some terror may even cleanse the soul and make the transition to nonviolence faster. Fanon considers short-term, preliminary, and immediate violence to be fully consistent with an emphasis on long-term universal reduction of violence. This certainly conflicts with Gandhi’s hypotheses!

It is in direct opposition to the hypothesis disclaiming that short-term violence may help: “Short-term violence counteracts long-term universal reduction of violence” \( (H_3, p. 63) \).

Destruction, sabotage, burning, and stealing manifest small-scale violence, and external expressions of and incitement to hatred are used as a means for strengthening the revolutionary resolve.

“Make a destructive program part of your campaign” \( (cf. N_2, p. 63) \) cannot be said to be a norm among the violence-promoting leaders, but the stress on “moral” encouragement by destruction of the bad is often present.

Physical violence is advocated by Fanon as a means of “burning bridges”:

The group requires that each individual perform an irrevocable action. In Algeria, for example, where almost all the men who called on the people to join in the national struggle were condemned to death or searched for by the French police, confidence was proportional to the hopelessness of each case. You could be sure of a new recruit when he could no longer go back into the colonial system. This mechanism, it seems, had existed in Kenya among the Mau-Mau, who required that each member of the group should strike a blow at the victim.

\( \text{(Fanon 1966: 67)} \)

Nonviolent actions strengthen the disposition for more (and stricter) nonviolent action, according to Gandhi. However, there is, unhappily(!), no irrevocability. At any level, one may slide back to violence.

The radical distinction between antagonisms and antagonists \( (cf. H_4, \text{pp. 66–67}) \) is not accepted by Fanon. It would ruin the appeal to hatred and vengeance. Hatred against suppression is hatred of the suppressors, says a politician advocating violent revolution in South America.

The negation of the existence of interests that are common to all \( (cf. H_7, \text{p. 67}) \) plays a considerable role.

The intellectual who for his part has followed the colonialist with regard to the universal abstract will fight in order that the settler and the native may live together in peace in a new world. But the thing he does not see . . . is that
the settler, from the moment that the colonial context disappears, has no longer any interest in remaining or in co-existing. (Fanon 1966: 36)

Labor and capital, poor whites and blacks, these and other antagonists have no common interest of the kind that can furnish a basis for future cooperation (cf. H₈, p. 68). But in Kenya and many other places, a considerable percentage of successful white settlers remained in the colony after political liberation. Fanon’s view on this point was historically not quite adequate.

The adherents of violent campaigns might subscribe to hypothesis H₉ (p. 68), that we invite violence from our opponent by humiliating him or provoking him, but this relation is taken sometimes to be a pro-argument for provocation and humiliation. In student demonstrations, premeditated provocation of the police and faculty plays a prominent role in many instances. We are reminded that theories of conflict can always be used in two ways: to exacerbate the potential of violence or to reduce it.

The Gandhian norm that you should move into the center of a conflict favors intensification of the conflict because you support the weaker part, the underdog. The norm implies a policy of confrontation, but not of provocation. The line may be difficult to draw, and there is in militant nonviolence always the risk of coercion and provocation. This practical difficulty, however, does not invalidate the distinction.

The student revolt has elicited what might be called “the new police violence” in many Western countries. The education of the police has not, until very recently, stressed nonviolence under strong verbal provocation (“pig!” etc.). The answer to such provocations is often what is aptly termed “unnecessary brutality.” Official rules learned by the police in England and many other countries preclude physical or verbal violence as an answer to verbal violence from demonstrators. The officially sanctioned way of pushing or carrying people away from prohibited places does not involve physical violence. People are coerced—they are carried or (leniently) pushed “against their will.” Theoretically such a procedure should not injure physically, and it should be tolerated insofar as one admits the authority of the police. If the number of police is insufficient to achieve the goal in this manner, the order to push or carry should not be given. The use of clubs to hit and injure is not an alternative. It would transgress the limits of police action (toward demonstrators occupying places without a warrant) and theo-
retically make the police part of a military force. The classical official doctrine of police action is a doctrine of nonviolence — with an exception, namely the rules for coercing without physical injury.

In nonviolent struggles in which the opponent has the necessary status to make free use of police forces, it is in the long-run interest to try to influence the police in the direction of consistent nonviolence. On certain occasions in the United States, such influence has prevailed. The police are, so to speak, interposed between the nonviolent fighters and the real opponent. To behave so as to make the police the main opponent is a grave misunderstanding of nonviolent strategy. The police and prison officers are important potential collaborators, in Gandhi’s view, and the more contact with such people, the better. Confrontations are part of efficient communication; not so, provocations.

Secrecy of moves, keeping the opponent in ignorance, makes it possible to surprise him and enables one to retain the initiative, a prominent feature in today’s violent struggle. However, this secrecy runs counter to the norms of (consistent, high-level) nonviolence (cf. *H11*, *N11*, pp. 69 and 75).

Journalists and reporters should be well received, but, of course, this does not preclude pestering them because of their distorted reports. The militant nonviolent fighter tries to keep informed about how actions are described in the mass media and tries to convert the reporters to his view. Secrecy stems in part from pessimism: reporters who have been against us cannot be turned into helpers. Fanon says:

> Frequently reporters complain of being badly received, of being forced to work under bad conditions and of being fenced round by indifference or hostility: all this is quite normal . . . when a journalist from the West asks us questions, it is seldom in order to help us. (Fanon 1966: 62)

In a great many cases, Gandhi answered hostile journalists, but he was not always able to convert them into supporters. His failures cannot and should not change the strategy, but they reflect a major difficulty — getting time for in-depth discussions — and they remind one of the importance of constructive, direct actions. The mere sight of the place of action and the action itself should as often as possible suffice to reveal its aim. This makes long explanations unnecessary. If a campaign consists mainly of such actions, unfair reporting is difficult even if the journalists disapprove.
As to the quest for truth in general, Fanon stresses the impossibility of truthfulness in the colonial situation:

In every age, among the people, truth is the property of the national cause. No absolute verity, no discourse on the purity of the soul can shake this position. The native replies to the living lie of the colonial situation by an equal falsehood. His dealings with his fellow-nationals are open; they are strained and incomprehensible with regard to the settlers. Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the foreigners. In this colonialist context there is no truthful behaviour. (Fanon 1966: 40)

According to the Gandhian hypotheses, truthful behavior in the colonialist context is not only possible, but has, in fact, been realized many times. The behavior of Abdul Ghaffar Kahn, first in India, then in Pakistan, furnishes many impressive instances. Furthermore, those hypotheses imply that there will be a transfer of untruthfulness from the colonial to the postcolonial struggles and also a transfer of narrow, pragmatic concepts of truth, for example, “Truth is what furthers our party in the struggle.”

Perhaps the Gandhian concept of truth is also pragmatic, if not narrow too? In terms of our systematization, we might consider accepting the maxim “Good is what furthers universal self-realization.” But the concept of truth as agreement with reality is conceptually independent of the good even if that maxim is adopted. Truth cannot possibly be a property of a national cause or any cause whatsoever, even the cause to further universal self-realization. The utilitarianism or pragmatism of Fanon and a great many others who are willing to give their lives for their cause is incompatible with the ethics of nonviolence. This ethics requires a concept of truth that is not dependent on causes. Truth cannot be monopolized by any cause whatsoever. The relation of this nonpragmatic conception to the aim of our pyramidal systematization is discussed on pages 56 f.

The question of truth, as Fanon sees it, is obscure. If an attack is made on a human dwelling belonging to a foreigner, the relevant questions are clear: Is anybody killed or injured? What relationships have those killed or injured to the goals of the campaign? What has been done to evacuate children? What has been done to influence the adults? To what use, favorable to the campaign, might the house be put? What will be the influence of the attack on foreigners in the neighborhood? On the attackers themselves? It is
on this concrete level that the sceptical attitude of Gandhi is relevant: Does this particular action lead to the short-term objective? What are the long-term effects? Could this or that particular case of burning or of meeting trust with distrust be avoided?

Systematic distortion of information and biased rendering of all moves by the opponent are of special importance in stimulating hatred and isolation and in tightening the cadres of fighters. Employing these techniques facilitates the formation of a homogeneous ingroup. The leaders must, of course, even according to Fanon, try to distinguish truth from (their own self-made) fiction, but it seems difficult to keep up an intensive flow of invectives without gradually beginning to believe in them or beginning to substitute propaganda for information. The case of Goebbels is a famous example of a man’s ultimate surrender to his own propaganda.

Self-scrutiny and insight into one’s own goals and motives make for less violent attitudes (cf. \( H_{12} \), p. 69) provided there is a basic willingness to stand up only for causes one is confident are just. However just the cause, one’s own motives are generally mixed. The resulting tension between belief in justice and one’s own mixed motivation engenders for reluctance to use violence.

This way of reasoning may be foreign to Gandhi, however. He was aware of, and did not hide, mixed motivation as a feature of past campaigns, but it seems that he required the satyāgrahin to be able to answer yes to the question ‘Is my motive when starting this new direct action unmixed: is it limited to realizing the goal of the campaign or might it also involve a wish to injure the opponent or some other deviant motive?’ The main question seems not to be whether motives are mixed or not, but whether, during the campaign, no irrelevant motive is capable of diverting the action from the path that is thought to be the best in order to reach the objective. A campaigner may, from very mixed motives, take a number of photographs of the opponent during a physical attack, but he will only make such use of them as is completely consistent with the goal of the campaign. A campaigner will in part for purely egocentric reasons try to avoid being maltreated, but he will try this within the limits of the norms of the campaign.

Your opponent is more likely to use violence if he thinks your case is unjust, and this he is likely to think if he sees his own point of view distorted and caricatured and your case described without regard to your actual, far-from-perfect behavior (cf. \( H_{13} \), p. 70).
The term *fanonization* has been used extensively at universities where sporadic physical and constant verbal violence has colored the campaigns. The “establishment” has hit back with renewed structural violence. Communication among outgroups is often retained, and a fierce picture of the struggle with ingroups is often maintained.

The general convincibility postulated in $H_4$ (p. 70) is denied in a fanonized struggle: some opponents are, and always will remain, uninfluenced, however good and just one’s cause. They are only impressed by “guns,” by force and threats. In such cases, it is of course considered time lost to try to convince the opponent.

It is surprising how such pessimistic views about the opponent crop up in practically every intensive struggle. Their influence just before and during riots or wars cannot easily be underestimated. They are used to justify the termination of conflict-resolving communication and to justify the absence of honest attempts to resume it after the breakdown.

The verbal violence on the campuses, especially the use of epithets and extreme accusations, is often an agreeable outlet of emotion and has little to do with those aspects of the interaction between the hostile groups that are causally effective. A wave of mutual accusations and denunciations may terminate seemingly without anyone admitting the correctness of any statement made by the adversary. Nevertheless, after some time, in a more relaxed atmosphere, some sort of solution or a compromise is arrived at on the practical level. The opposing groups have influenced each other, and their views have come to diverge less than before, but nothing of this is clearly admitted. The verbal violence perhaps functions as a secondary emotional gratification, making it easier to accept unwelcome compromises and ad hoc solutions with manifest drawbacks. If this is the case, the Gandhian purist would rather complain about a general lack of mental discipline (*brahmacarya*) than of serious violence. Some of the leaders of rebellion would concede this but point out that the lack of mental discipline is due to the frustrations caused by a thoroughly repressive system. One has to mobilize all who are willing to fight the system, whatever their level of mental discipline. If leaders were to demand acceptance of Gandhian norms, too few would partake in the fight.

It would take too much space to go through the rest of the norm system in our confrontation of Gandhi and the New Violence. Suffice it to say that the tendency to justify or accept violence leads to a thoroughly different conflict strategy from that of nonviolence.
What to Learn from the Reaction Against Nonviolence

Instead of pursuing a contrast of contemporary ideas of violent social revolution with nonviolent social revolution, we shall concentrate on certain basic similarities between the two ways of thinking and also on important necessary conditions or prerequisites of successful nonviolence today. The critique of postwar nonviolent campaigns has helped to remind us of such conditions.

The leading supporters of violence interpret the term widely. Their interpretation is at one point strikingly similar to Gandhi’s use of the term, which includes suppression and exploitation under the concept of violence. Open violence is contrasted to structural violence.

"P uses structural violence in relation to Q" may be thus defined: “P introduces or supports a set of coercive social relations that create barriers against Q’s complete self-realization.” The coerciveness usually depends on a judicial system that can threaten Q if he rebels against the suppression. The social relations usually have an economic character, but conceiving of them as fundamentally economic leads to narrowness of perception.

The definition does not, of course, furnish us with a clear concept, but it seems to cover an important use of the term structural violence, and it connects with the metaphysics of satyagraha. One weakness of the definition consists in the tacitness of the assumption that the barriers are objectively unnecessary, that is, that economic and other conditions are such in the society in which P and Q act that one could afford Q the higher degree of self-expression made possible by lifting the barriers. In order to clarify this assumption, we would have to introduce a large portion of contemporary (highly controversial!) sociological and economic conceptual theory.

Absence of manifest physical person-to-person violence is not enough to characterize a relation as nonviolent, according to theorists of the New Violence. Barriers to complete self-realization or, more precisely, to a degree of self-realization deemed practically realizable given certain existing economic and technical resources are taken to indicate conditions of violence. The economic underdog–top dog relation is taken equally seriously by Gandhi and the new leaders of violence as a kind of violence (himsa). Gandhi once even called exploitation “the essence of violence” (Harijan 4.11.1939: 226; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 369). However, there are also other similarities.
The criticism of past nonviolent campaigns concerning race relations has centered around the slowness of the machinery and the timidity and modesty of their claims. Nonviolent movements in the United States have not until recently asked for “justice now.”

Gandhi at least sometimes asked for immediate basic changes. In 1942, he started the “quit-India!” campaign — one of his least successful, perhaps — but not untypical of his impatience and “immodesty”; it reflected his belief in the practical possibility of, as well as the immediate need for, a rapid radical change, that is, a nonviolent revolution. Appeals to students to leave the colleges and fight for freedom are examples of actions based on a requirement of rapid change. What made Gandhi sometimes choose rather modest targets was the very realistic suspicion that the Indian populace was far from ripe for taking over the institutions led by the British. Further, what made him sometimes cancel campaigns was the also realistic suspicion that the population was not yet sufficiently nonviolent, which means that they would not be able to achieve what Gandhi saw as the goal: a nonviolent society.

But on the whole, revolutionary impatience is something the new leaders of violence have in common with Gandhi. It is also a point where he differs from Martin Luther King, Jr. and some of the other great civil rights personalities. Gandhi had a toughness and disregard for bloody confrontations that many Christian pacifists felt bordered on savagery.

There is still another similarity: the brutal Gandhian norm “Seek the center of the conflict” or, more generally, the stress on activist confrontations with the system. Gandhi strongly resented passivity or mere verbal support of fighters, and he emphasized how participation in direct action radicalizes.

The new tendency is to proclaim that things cannot continue as they are, radical change must come immediately; no one can be allowed to remain passive. Polarization of opinion, however painful, is necessary. Further, with the present productive capacity and manpower, a just and nonviolent society can be realized.

Some of these points reveal the stress on antagonisms, on structures rather than on antagonists. This stress is a main feature of Marxist thinking. Certain antagonisms must immediately be eliminated — but without necessarily eliminating any of the antagonists.

As a consequence of proclaiming it a duty to act vigorously and immediately, the new leaders, just as Gandhi, engage in lively direct agitation and
preaching at the grass roots, refusing to be hampered by democratic machinery. If the machinery is ill equipped to cope with large-scale injustice, direct action must be resorted to. Gandhi did not try to quell communal riots through laws and parliamentary action.

Indian nationalist politicians of the Congress Party accepted Gandhi as a leader because of his unrivaled influence among the masses, at the grass roots, but there was always uneasiness about his relation to the party system and later to the whole parliamentary setup. It suited neither his temper nor his philosophy.

There is, in Gandhi’s view, nothing sacred about the electoral or legal system. Yet there is, of course, a grave responsibility associated with suspending or violating the system. Every plan to break a law must be thoroughly discussed and illuminated before its implementation.

The Basic Requirement of Self-Respect: Fearlessness

When Gandhi left South Africa and started work in India, he realized that the masses in India could not immediately be mobilized to political action for independence, for swaraj.

From prolonged hunger or undernourishment apathy follows. Gandhi sometimes complained that the most frustrating thing of all was the unwillingness of the hungry to do anything to change their own personal lot. He found that the basic obstacle when trying to mobilize the masses was their feeling of powerlessness, uselessness, and insignificance. From this attitude there follows a lack of personal identity and personal norms and, of course, lack of initiative to find ways of producing more and better food.

Gandhi was unable to effect any radical change in the food situation; he could not eliminate undernourishment and unemployment. However, in spite of this, he managed to awaken the masses and to mobilize them. How? One of his greatest inventions was the Khadi.

The Khadi movement and certain similar undertakings had a variety of aims. But one basic aim was precisely to get the poor, unemployed, suppressed, and passive to realize that they were persons with an identity, a dignity; they were worth something, and they were not completely helpless.

At this point, it might be inserted that political opponents of Gandhi described the Khadi movement as if it were Gandhi’s complete answer to In-
dia's economic crisis. This way of misconceiving the movement was repeated in a well-known article by the author Arthur Koestler in the *Sunday Times*, October 5, 1969. But Gandhi did not nurture “the fantastic hope of solving India’s economic problems by bringing back the handloom and the spinning wheel.” He had great confidence in intensive agriculture, including irrigation, using refined machinery. He had less confidence in industrialization as a means of overcoming poverty and lack of work in the villages. The increasing flow of the unemployed toward great cities created terrible problems. The ugly riots were all starting in the big slums. Gandhi saw the necessity of creating conditions such that people could on the whole remain in their villages except for the few that big industry would need. Indian Marxists were squarely against his economic views, being convinced that the proper course of India was the one followed in Soviet Russia in the years after the revolution, that is, immediately giving first priority to heavy industry. The correctness of this policy is now much disputed, but its advocates in the 1920s and 1930s of course found Gandhi’s stress on agriculture insufferably reactionary.

Gandhi’s propaganda for the spinning wheel was first of all a successful campaign against the total passivity and resulting lack of self-respect of the very poor. Making their cloth meant for thousands of jobless wretches the start of a new kind of life and participation in a national struggle for liberation. Marxists at that time were very much against the religious aura surrounding the spinning wheel, and the poet Tagore detested the frenzy of the campaigns.

If a hundred or two hundred million underfed and more or less jobless villagers in India were to try to get industrial work in the cities, what would happen? “Heavy industries will need to be centralized and nationalized. But they will occupy the least part of the vast national activity which will mainly be in the villages” (cf. Gandhi 1951c). He had “no partiality for return to primitive methods,” but village industry was the only “way of giving employment to the millions who are living in idleness.” Gandhi went perhaps too far in his fight for decentralization and against the creation of big proletariats, but recent developments in the West have made Gandhian value priorities worth serious study.

The participation of the poor and underprivileged in the Khadi movement and vigorous campaigns such as the salt march, with obvious, spectacularly direct relevance for their economic well-being fostered that minimum
of self-respect indispensable for meaningful participation in nonviolent campaigns. One may say that Gandhi’s strategy included as a preliminary step the lifting up of people from the status of nonentities to a level at which self-realization was conceivable as an aim. Only on that level could self-discipline, born of self-respect and dignity, be reckoned upon under harsh provocations and frustrations. Self-respect, in short, is a prerequisite for nonviolent mass campaigns.

Martin Luther King, Jr. was completely clear about the basic function of self-respect in struggles for liberation:

With a spirit straining toward true self-esteem, the Negro must boldly throw off the manacles of self-abnegation and say to himself and the world: “I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with dignity and honor.”

(King 1967: 43–44)

However, to exhort a black man in the ghetto who does not feel he is somebody to boldly tell the world “I am somebody” is not a meaningful strategy. The strategy had to be one of leading black people from “nothing and nowhere” toward a point at which they could honestly say “I am somebody.” Only then may the process start of boldly throwing off all the signs of slavery. “Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery,” says King (see p. 115). Yes, but that weapon must be forged, and those who do not have that firm sense of self-esteem are precisely those who cannot do the forging by themselves.

Gandhi and King both faced the question of creating self-respect, but it seems that Gandhi may have been more inventive in his choice of methods or that the social and cultural condition of the Indian peasants was in certain senses better than that of the American blacks in their ghettos.

Violence Preferable to Cowardice

Fearlessness is indispensable for the growth of the other noble qualities. How can one seek Truth, or cherish Love, without fearlessness? (Bose 1948: 24)

Gandhi held fearlessness to be a necessary condition for all other high qualities. It has a position in his system that can only be justified by linking it
closely to necessary conditions of self-realization and therefore of active search for truth.

To run away from danger, instead of facing it, is to deny one's faith in man and God, even one's own self. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 144)

If a person is not willing to take risks, he will not follow any insight, any personal conviction if it seems dangerous to do so. Lack of fearlessness Gandhi likes to call cowardice, even if this lack is rather modest and quite common.

The long road toward nonviolence cannot be followed, according to Gandhi, if one does not fight cowardice — even when it entails acting with violence. Some quotations are needed in order to develop his somewhat complicated views on this point.

I found, throughout my wanderings in India, that India, educated India, is seized with a paralyzing fear. We may not open our lips in public; we may not declare our confirmed opinions in public . . . . [If] you want to follow the view of Truth in any shape or form, fearlessness is the necessary consequence . . . . We fear consequences and therefore we are afraid to tell the truth.

(YMCA address, “The Vow of Fearlessness,” 1916; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 358)

I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.

(Young India 4.8.1920: 5; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 142)

Critics of King stress that a man who lacks self-respect and self-identity cannot — or at least cannot be expected to — refrain from violence when met with violence, except out of cowardice. His reflexes answer violence with violence; the question is only, Do I dare? King and pacifists in general have tended to reject counterviolence at the same time as they have deplored cowardice.

It is the choice between violence and cowardice in such cases that the Black Power critics (in the wide sense of the term Black Power) tell us characterizes the situation for the majority of black citizens in the United States. They meet daily structural discrimination and structural violence.

If the choice between violence and cowardice is constantly repeated and if the victim of violence answers every time to “Dare I?” by turning
away—avoiding the conflict or meekly turning the other cheek—a cowardly attitude is reinforced. The chance of standing up next time and of hitting back decreases. In the long run, the chances of standing up in any way whatsoever decrease.

This kind of description by the Black Power leaders not only reminds us of similar descriptions by Gandhi; it follows Gandhi’s utterances word by word.

The new leaders exhort their poor followers to hit back if insulted. Compare this with Gandhi:

If you feel humiliated, you will be justified in slapping the bully in the face or taking whatever action you might deem necessary to vindicate your self-respect. The use of force, in the circumstances, would be the natural consequence if you are not a coward. But if you have assimilated the non-violent spirit, there should be no feeling of humiliation in you.

(Harijan 9.3.1942)

One might add that the person with nonviolent spirit does not feel humiliated by insulting behavior on the part of others because his self-respect nullifies the effect of the insult. The insulting words or deeds simply do not impress him, and he naturally does not feel any smaller. There is no feeling of shame, of reduction in status, of loss of dignity. It is the aggressor that loses in dignity, not the so-called victim.

The quotation makes a priority clear: of the two goals “Stop conceiving of yourself as humiliated” and “Stop answering violence with violence,” the first is prior. Only when the first goal has already been reached can the second be accepted unconditionally.

The quotation is not only significant as one among dozens of clear statements assessing the negative value of cowardice as greater than the negative value of violence; it is also one of the few but clear indications of the immense importance Gandhi attached to self-respect. Faced with a potential loss of self-respect, it is the prime concern of the individual to avoid the loss. Loss of self-respect must be avoided even if the only way to do it, as perceived by the individual, is to be violent, to be criminal, to murder. This seems to be the consequence of Gandhi’s remark on humiliation and violence.

How can Gandhi justify going to such extremes? The answer is that without a minimum of self-respect, of inner security, one cannot even reach the road leading toward self-realization, and this again means that one can-
not start on the road toward nonviolence. That road takes off from the road toward self-realization, not vice versa. The man feeling he is nobody, a no-person, may help himself to be somebody by acts that cannot be tolerated by mature persons.

An important lesson expressed by the quotation can be summed up as follows: participants in a conflict perceive the situation differently according to their level of self-respect. At a very low level, the behavior of the opponent is likely to be experienced as humiliating and provocative. To let oneself be provoked indicates loss of self-respect and admission of powerlessness. At a higher level, with higher degrees of self-security, no violent behavior of the opponent is experienced as humiliating, and none as provocative. Then, one’s own violence may be experienced as humiliating, not that of the opponent. A concentration camp guard tends to believe that when a prisoner is forced to creep through mud in front of hundreds of his fellow inmates, the prisoner loses dignity and self-respect, whereas the witnesses only see the loss of these qualities in the guard.

In India, Gandhi succeeded to an unprecedented degree in raising the weak masses to a substantial level of self-respect. They were made capable of following a leader. The magic spell of Gandhi was even stronger than the imperative force of a man in uniform swinging a formidable club (lāthī) and throwing people in jail. But, of course, nonviolence never matured into a deep-rooted power in India. Provocations such as those experienced in the years 1946–48 proved too strong, and there was a lapse toward large-scale violence among the masses.

In the United States, the urbanized blacks did not feel they had a living cultural tradition strong enough to furnish a source of self-respect and nonviolent power. When Martin Luther King, Jr. began his bus campaign in 1955, mobilizing fifty thousand blacks, he seems to have started with masses on an even lower stage of development of self-respect and dignity than did Gandhi when in April 1919 he inaugurated his all-India satyagraha movement to secure withdrawal of the Rowlatt Bills. Black Power leaders have proved to possess a keen eye for means of raising the level of self-respect. Thus, their demand for large-scale instruction in African culture at schools and universities shows their deliberate effort to give their followers inner security. The propaganda for African hairstyles, clothing, and other external signs of pride in being black manifest the same tendency.
Violence as a Means to Increase Self-Respect

Whatever the causes, King and his faithful followers did not succeed in mass mobilization on a continental or subcontinental scale. Wonderful feats of nonviolence under brutal attacks and supreme personal achievement in civil rights cases could not make up for the lack of mass support. Impatience grew by leaps and bounds, and the cry for immediate, radical change was heard more and more often. It issued from people who knew the potentialities of nonviolence: “You know history has been triggered by trivial-seeming incidents. Once a little nobody Indian lawyer was put off a train, and fed up with injustice, he twisted a knot in the British Lion’s tail. His name was Mahatma Gandhi!” (Malcolm X 1965: 272). But they did not believe in the prospect of consistent nonviolence in the crisis of race relations.

Now, what the Black Power leaders have done is essentially to tolerate and to some extent encourage counterviolence, to hit back when hit; and it is my hypothesis that the subtle, not always conscious, but strong motive has been that of building up self-respect, a sense of dignity, and a feeling of inner security. There have, of course, been mixed motives, and the expressed aims testify to this; but there is enough evidence and material, verbal and nonverbal, to maintain the self-respect theory of Black Power violence.

Incidentally, Sartre seems (in his preface to Fanon’s book) to agree with Black Power leaders on the function of counterviolence:

The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscover his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself creates his self. Far removed from his war, we consider it as a triumph of barbarism; but of its own volition it achieves, slowly but surely, the emancipation of the rebel, for bit by bit it destroys in him and around him the colonial gloom. . . . To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time; there remain a dead man, and a free man. . . .

(Sartre in Fanon 1966: 18–19)

Fanon puts it in this way:

At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.

(Fanon 1966: 73)
At a deeper, psychoanalytic level, Erik H. Erikson traces the connection between Fanon's killing and the basic Gandhian hypothesis that violence against the other is violence against oneself (cf. *H 4*, p. 48):

That killing, in fact, may be a necessary self-cure for colonialized people was Dr. Frantz Fanon's conviction and message. . . . An implicit therapeutic intent, then, seems to be a common denominator in theories and ideologies of action which, on the level of deeds, seem to exclude each other totally. What they nevertheless have in common is the intuition that violence against the adversary and violence against the self are inseparable; what divides them is the programme of dealing with either. (Erikson 1969: 74)

King, in a quote cited earlier, puts it in a slightly different way:

With a spirit straining toward true self-esteem, the Negro must boldly throw off the manacles of self-abnegation and say to himself and the world: “I am somebody. I am a person. I am a man with dignity and honor.”

(King 1967: 43–44)

Showing his understanding of the basic function of self-respect in the struggle for liberation, King continues, as cited earlier (p. 110):

Psychological freedom, a firm sense of self-esteem, is the most powerful weapon against the long night of physical slavery. (Ibid., p. 43)

Our contention is that a minimum of self-esteem is a necessary condition for nonviolent as well as violent struggle and that no exhortations but only action can help to create that minimum requirement if it is absent. The critical question, however, is, Must the action be violent? Gandhi’s answer is no, that of Sartre and Fanon, yes.

One is justified in concluding that none of the tough Black Power leaders take physical violence to be more than a preliminary to more constructive efforts. The mental violence—abuse, vilification, distortion in words—will perhaps remain popular as an outlet, but sooner or later constructive efforts will be seen to suffer disproportionately from the hot flow of verbal provocation. There will probably be a tendency toward nonviolent noncooperation and the building of parallel institutions, at least in the economic sector. The war of words and small-scale, unorganized, personal aggressiveness will be found to be uneconomical, too costly, if not degrading, and undig-
nified for race-conscious blacks who clearly see that such tough behavior is characteristic of the whites they despise.

Our aim has been to describe and compare different points of view, not to offer criticism. Perhaps it will therefore be not entirely inappropriate to make a small personal comment: we agree that nonpremeditated, spontaneous violence is sometimes a cleansing force. However, the cleansing force is dependent on spontaneity. Premeditated violence instigated by gang leaders and supported by articulated group norms is scarcely a cleansing force. Therefore, the policy of violence, deliberate plans to use violence as a means in certain group conflicts, cannot be vindicated as a means of creating self-respect. Nor does this policy seem able to solve the long-range problems King had in mind. Furthermore, Black Power leaders tend to defend violence mainly as a desperate means to protect themselves individually against murderous police forces. We thus return to the nonviolent approach, but with a better understanding of the indispensability of constructive programs and an appreciation of the necessity of efforts to increase self-respect among the weakest groups.

**Satyāgraha Is Not a Set of Techniques**

In a description of Gandhi’s *satyāgraha*, one error has perhaps been more damaging for adequate understanding than all the others put together: the description of *satyāgraha* as a mere bundle of techniques. A central characteristic of a technique is its pure instrumentality, its character of being a mere means to an end.

Consider the technique of shooting: a gun may be used by anyone with sufficient know-how. Its use may be quite independent of the thoughts and motivation of the person using it. But this is emphatically not the case with nonviolence. For an action to be part of a nonviolent campaign, it must conform, at least roughly, to the norms and hypotheses characteristic of nonviolence, these being the conscious expressions of nonviolent behavior, attitudes, and institutions. The normative system implied may, of course, be conceived in somewhat different ways and one may have different degrees of approximation to an ideal campaign. However, the techniques, described in terms of overt behavior, cannot be detached from the characteristic norms and hypotheses. A strike, a stay-at-home, or a fast, described in terms of behavior, are not yet instances of *satyāgraha*. They must conform with norms and hy-
potheses of satyāgraha, and they are therefore unsuccessful if the opponent or the general public perceives only the behavior, not its symbolic aspect.

Joan Bondurant and others have tried to compare levels of purity of non-violence in different campaigns. One must, of course, allow for practical errors of judgment and some transgression of norms, but there is less room for variation in intention. If there is no serious resolve to act nonviolently, following most of the norms, this has immediate consequences for how one appears to and is interpreted by the opponent. It is in most cases easy to detect superficiality. One of the most ruinous attitudes is that of trying out nonviolence, and, if that does not lead to success, intending to use violence. This strategy leads to a head-on collision with the norms and hypotheses of nonviolence. The thought “I shall first be nonviolent, and if it does not succeed, I am justified in using violence” is contradictory. There can be no such first-stage nonviolence.

The (implicit, rarely explicit) rejection of satyāgraha by the leaders of the New Violence is based in part on this misleading picture of satyāgraha: black people are described as partaking in a march or other action as if the external behavior were identical with the action of satyāgraha. The picture lacks a description of a positive content of the action itself, its goal-revealing aspect. Furthermore, the attitude of black people is described in terms of humiliation and passivity: their being abused, hit in the face without their “doing anything.” They have also been described as obsessed by fear and hatred all along. Their church is burned; what shall they do? Nothing, according to certain black-leader descriptions of the nonviolence of Martin Luther King, Jr.

From the preliminary definition of a satyāgraha campaign as a campaign consistent with, and expressive of, a nonviolent system of norms and hypotheses, it immediately follows that satyāgraha is not a technique. The inclusion of hypotheses is essential; one cannot be asked to believe in certain hypotheses as part of a technique. The technique of firing a gun is independent of any beliefs concerning the meaning and consequences of the behavior involved in firing it.

Individuals are not simply masters of their own beliefs; they cannot normally adopt and reject beliefs according to the needs of the moment. Insofar as they are able to do this, they violate the requirements of truthfulness. Nor can they believe in a norm, or respect it, as part of a technique. But they can believe in norms and hypotheses as part of a total creed and develop
techniques of action that are consistent with, and expressive of, this creed. Thus, they may be asked to break a law, to distribute food, to carry a banner, and so on, as part of a campaign expressive of a creed. If the creed is absent, they cannot do what is asked.

To call satyagraha a method rather than a technique is less misleading because the etymological meaning involves that of a way of acting or living. But if a nonviolent campaign is said to be a way of planning and carrying out a campaign, it is only a way that can be adopted by persons who share certain beliefs and attitudes. The confusing point about this terminology is that some of these beliefs and attitudes are part of "the way." Thus, in discussions in which theoretical clarity is at issue, satyagraha should not be classified only as a method or way of struggle or conflict solution.

How much is required of shared beliefs depends on one’s role in the campaign. Gandhi expected much more of a leader and strategist than of a follower. Confronted with the hypotheses characteristic of belief in satyagraha, many people, including military leaders, will hesitate to squarely reject or accept them as true or as convincing or highly probable. Uncertainty prevails as to their relative validity or invalidity. It therefore makes sense when military leaders or others who traditionally support institutions of violence favor experiments in satyagraha. They favor its tentative use in various kinds of situations. It makes sense insofar as it is a reasonable way of testing the hypotheses that the satyagrahins assert with some dogmatism. However, those engaged in mere testing are not yet satyagrahins. Satyagraha cannot be used properly because it is not a technique, not an instrument.

This point is of importance because the opponent cannot be expected to be impressed by an appeal to the brain and the heart, when the appeal is an experimental appeal, a test of power. The difference from a genuine appeal is all too clear in face-to-face confrontations. An appeal to the heart is expected to come from the heart, not from the brain of the experimenter.

The mistake of taking satyagraha to be a technique is, of course, not as widespread as the tendency to use the word technique for it. Some of the theoreticians (Bondurant and others) who use the word make it clear that it is not a technique in the sense of a mere instrumentality, independent of the convictions and attitudes of the user. The various activities involved in satyagraha may contain the use of techniques—for instance, making salt, spinning, preparing meals, beating drums, singing songs, building houses, and operating banks. But these are not characteristic of the satyagraha as a whole.
The lighthearted use of the term *technique* and the neglect of systematic study of the roots of nonviolence in ethics and metaphysics has facilitated an incorrect classification of some political, racial, and student campaigns as nonviolent. Demonstrations, strikes, and fasts have been classified as Gandhian and conceived as nonviolent when they have only avoided manifest physical violence. Their lack of success, however, often seems to be due to their neglect of the basic norms of Gandhian struggle.

Isolated traits of Gandhian conflict behavior have been studied from the point of view of game theory. Thus, R. E. Klitgaard uses "two-party conflict models" to study *satyagraha* "as a tactic" (Klitgaard 1971: 143). He does not deny that it is sometimes a successful tactic but finds that it contains "many contradictions and inconsistent strategic implications" (ibid., p. 152). This is hardly surprising. What is lamentable is the more or less implicit assumption that one has to either think of Gandhi as a tactician or treat him as a saint and refrain from analysis. Gandhian conflict behavior must be studied in relation to a norm system. Any analysis solely in terms of tactic, technique, or method must lead astray.

The Use of Violence as a Sign of Impotency

As systematized by our set of norms and hypotheses, any kind of violence in any kind of conflict situation violates at least one norm. Violence is never right. One may quote Gandhi in support of this unrestricted condemnation. But, as is very well known and has been extensively discussed since the time of the Boer War, Gandhi gave his moral support to groups engaged in war or other violent conflicts. Furthermore, he accepted, recommended, and justified the physical violence to, and injury of, human beings. He has even postulated it as a duty under certain circumstances for certain persons to use physical violence against opponents. This last duty seems to flatly contradict norm N3 (p. 63), never to resort to violence against an opponent.

There is no easy way of bringing consistency into this seemingly confused aggregate of sayings and actions. The least intricate way, in our opinion, is to take the consequences of three facts:

1. Gandhi’s acceptance, recommendation, vindication, and “duty-postulation” of an act of violence occurs only in relation to a definite person or (small) group of persons.
2. The persons by whom the violence is positively (or at least not negatively) valued are in a state of impotency and manifest helplessness. They are at least momentarily not able to follow the norms against physical violence.

3. For such persons it is an inescapable duty to act immediately in the situation in which they find themselves — to act in support of a manifest, high-level goal.

The state of impotency does not have as a consequence a rejection of the system of nonviolence, but the system is nevertheless violated by these persons; they create an evil. However, the evil does not discredit them as persons. It is rather their lack of foresight, their lack of training in nonviolence that is discreditable.

There are, for these persons, ethically meaningful questions to be asked: What can I, should I, or must I do, being in a momentary state of impotency? Gandhi has some answers to these questions. They are not part of his teaching on nonviolence, and they cannot be made part of its systematization. They nevertheless lie within the framework of his total ethics. The ethics of group struggle, as portrayed on pages 53–57 does not take into account comparisons of evils, that is, ethically valid judgments of the kind “A is a greater evil than B.” A person in a state of impotency may have to decide to create evils, but his attempt to create a minimum is in this situation laudable, not damnable. The act does not discredit the person. On the other hand, the state of impotency may be due in part to the neglect of training in nonviolence. It was a recurring lament of Gandhi’s that the Hindus neglected this training and that the politicians of the Congress Party did not support his plan of nonviolent brigades in every danger area of religious conflict. The frequent clashes between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs would give ample training in nonviolence. This would minimize the chance of situations of nonviolent impotency.

In conclusion, we may say that Gandhi did not condone violence in any situation. Violence, not specified as the violent act of a definite person, is as such always an evil. On the other hand, given a definite person in a definite situation, an act of violence committed by that person sometimes justifies our saying, “N. N. acted correctly,” “It was a duty of N. N. to act as he did.” The terms correct or right and wrong attach here directly to the person: “The
person was right in doing so-and-so,” “It would have been right for any other person in this state and in this situation to act as N. N. did.”

This way of looking at the matter not only brings formal consistency into the teaching of Gandhi, but shows how naturally the seemingly contradictory maxims can find their dwelling within one person.

Gandhi’s Notion of Nonviolence: Axiology or Deontology?

The claims made by the norms of our systematization are deontological: they say what must or should be. One such claim is that anyone should do as the norms tell. There is no gradation: either you should do it, or it is not the case that you should. *Tertium non datur*. In a value system, there is gradation. Some values are taken to be higher than others, a relation not to be confused with that of derivation.

It is tempting to solve the problems Gandhi poses for the systematizer by recommending violence under some circumstances by taking “courageous defense of the helpless, whether nonviolent or violent” as a higher value than “abstention from violence because of cowardice.”

The axiological view might be formulated as follows: “Values are worth realizing, but there is a hierarchy of values, there are priorities, in both the positive and the negative realm.” Thus, the most important function of grading positive and negative values in making a conceptual reconstruction is to make precise what to do under non-ideal conditions, especially when the shortcomings taken for granted are those of humans.

It follows that the unconditional abstention from violence is, strictly speaking (according to Gandhi), only the highest realizable value for a definite person $P$ in a definite situation $S$, provided $P$ is not a firm believer in violence in $S$ or provided $P$ is a coward (is dominated by fear in $S$). If $P$ is dominated by fear, he should act violently rather than run away. And if he is convinced that an act of violence is the only possible means of reaching a (good) end in $S$, he should perform the violent deed.

In these sentences, we have used deontological language (“should”) together with axiological (“best”). The complications resulting from Gandhi’s outlook on cowardice may be addressed with a normative, deontological system, but it is much more convenient, even natural, to use an axiological system. A person who in $S$ behaves nonviolently and fearlessly is realizing a
higher value (his behavior is better) than a person who in S behaves violently and fearlessly. Further, this person is again acting more valuably than one who acts nonviolently out of cowardice. Of the three values, two are positive and one negative. The less high value is positive insofar as the action is recommended in certain situations. If Gandhi even goes so far as to make it a duty to act violently in certain cases, a positive value must in those cases somehow be realized by the violent action.

Grave consequences, however, flow from the axiological approach. According to this interpretation, it is not sentences of the form “If x, then use violence” that reflect Gandhi’s thinking, but rather those of the form “If you cannot do what you should do, prefer violence to cowardice.” In this sentence it is implied that what you do is wrong. This is very different from the point of view of the performatory use of language, which implies that what you do is the next best or next to the next best. According to Gandhi, (1) there is no definite limit to the strengthening of one’s nonviolent capacity, and (2) one is not permitted to calculate beforehand what one might not be able to do nonviolently in a future situation. Gandhi did not argue that we could decide on the limits of our capacity for nonviolence well in advance of a particular, acute conflict situation. “Impotency is avoidable.” This hypothesis is taken to be valid until the conflict situation is present physically in the form of a threat to persons who are obviously too weak to resist direct physical attack. In such situations the satyagrahin may be justified in proclaiming that he is in a state of impotency, and it may be his duty physically to attack the aggressor.

In conclusion, we shall retain the deontological approach. We shall also speak of degrees of wrongness, weakness, and error and distinguish degrees of the seriousness of breaks with norms of nonviolence. However, we shall not try to incorporate norms such as “Be violent rather than a coward” into the norm system.

When heavily exploited, some people today resort to physical violence, while others respond with widespread indignation and a warning to resort to legal means. If we take the term violence to cover any avoidable severe curtailment of the possibilities of self-realization of others, the indignation is misplaced if not accompanied by a parallel indignation at the structural and sometimes physical violence suffered by those who are being exploited. As it is now, the outcry is rather one of “How dare you do violence!” instead of “How dare we remain passive!”
Constructive, Goal-Revealing Campaigns

Gandhi was a great believer in person-to-person contact. He was a believer in the possibility of showing, rather than telling, the opponent what a campaign aims toward. Excepting the Khadi movement, he did not take very seriously the talk about campaigns and the glorifying accounts of their implementation. He expressed a low estimation of the function of his periodicals Harijan and Young India. He did not deplore their suppression! He thought that a campaign would have a stronger appeal when it showed what the campaigners wished to realize than when he talked about it. To him, a campaign would be more powerful when it showed the positive future state of affairs (untouchables praying in temples, making salt) than when it showed the present negative state of affairs (the clubbing of campaigners, pictures of fat rich people, and so forth).

The requirements or ideal of constructivity favor the establishment of parallel institutions and parallel business. This is the main reason why the slogan “Take care of business” (T.C.B.) may be regarded as the indirect offspring of the nonviolent campaigns in the United States.

Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton conclude their book Black Power with the following highly relevant proclamation:

[W]hatever the consequences, there is a growing — a rapidly growing — body of black people determined to “T.C.B.”— take care of business. They will not be stopped in their drive to achieve dignity, to achieve their share of power, indeed to become their own men and women—in this time and in this land—by whatever means necessary. (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967: 184–85)

The work in parallel institutions can go admirably hand in hand with other parts of a constructive program. Selfless work is needed in order, for instance, to build and operate a cooperative or a school. Teachers may perhaps not get a decent salary in the first year but will they be “ruining” their careers? There is ample opportunity for constructive suffering.

Gandhi tried to implement the formation of parallel institutions, but not with great success. Some of the basic parts of the constructive program, such as help for the untouchables and the Khadi, exhausted most of the available energy of his followers. There was not much left for building schools, establishing law courts, and so on.
In the case of the salt satyagraha, the manufacturing and storing of salt and its distribution to the poor were all positive measures consistent with a T.C.B. norm.

Struggle by means of constructive campaigns seems to have a great future in societies with a fairly high level of personal, not necessarily private, enterprise. With sufficiently widespread public support, almost anything can be realized by a simple resolution to act as if an institutional change were already realized. This holds well, for instance, in educational institutions.

Central authorities may stop financial support of one rebelling school, but if nearly all schools are radically changed by teachers and students, it is unlikely that financial support can be stopped.

If a tiny group favors a radical institutional change that the rest of the community ignores or considers worthless, the conflict is, of course, of a very different kind. The small group must somehow get the rest to pay attention and reconsider, and at that moment, acts of violence are (in many countries) more likely to get reported in the mass media than anything else.

Does the constructive approach go against those who ask for an immediate and radical change in society, a change that destroys all present institutions? Not necessarily. A judicial system is destroyed by not being used by anyone; the same holds for voting. If an institution is left to die because a completely different one is being created, there is a radical constructive, not destructive, change. There is no limit to the application of the approach; but inertia makes it highly improbable that old institutions can be destroyed overnight. The experience of Mao Tse-tung is a recent grand-scale manifestation of this point. On the other hand, physical destruction also has limited consequences. All prisons might be blown up without the prison system being affected. New, more solid prisons may be built, and the sale of dynamite curtailed!

In short, the maxim “The whole system must be destroyed” does not rule out constructivity. What rules it out is the addition “before we can think of what might replace it.” No definite new system may be needed, but new mores are at least required in a radically changed situation.

**Constructivity and Destructivity in Gandhi’s Salt Satyagraha**

Constructivity — the visual, concrete, clear manifestation of goals — is of the utmost importance when trying to solve the constant problem of com-
munication with immediate opponents, for instance, with the police and soldiers (national guard and so forth). In severe conflicts, the satyagrahin is not confronted with an antagonism, but with physically present antagonists. The antagonist directly in front of him may not even know about the antagonism.

Let us take the salt satyagraha as an example, clearly announced to the viceroy in the famous letter of March 2, 1930. To march 2,41 miles is in itself communicative only as proof of persistence, will, and stamina. But the salt march was one from Ahmedabad to the sea, where it was announced that salt was to be made from seawater.

The direction of the march plus the culminating manifestation, the easily understandable making of salt, made the salt march positive and indicative of the goal of the campaign. Compare this with the poor people’s march to the bureaucratic center in Washington, D.C. What were they to do in Washington except speak against the government and experience the deteriorating effect of unemployment? They could not perform actions in Washington that showed what they wanted. The campaign lacked salt.

There was an obvious need for poor people in India to use salt and there was an obvious difficulty for them to pay taxes and get the necessary salt from the British monopolistic stores. Nevertheless, police had to interfere with the very process of making salt because it violated a law. The campaign was arranged in such a way that violence against the campaigners struck them at the moment of realizing, of anticipating, the kind of social relations envisaged only in a nonviolent society. The opponent had to try to destroy this very relation, attacking even the making of a small pinch of salt for personal consumption.

Let us contrast this action with a later development of the salt satyagraha that did not have this positive, goal-revealing nature.

In the beginning of May 1930, Gandhi prepared a notice to the Viceroy:

God willing it is my intention on . . . to set out for Dharasana . . . and demand possession of the salt works. The public have been told that Dharasana is a private property. This is mere camouflage. It is as effectively under government control as the Viceroy’s House. Not a pinch of salt can be removed without the previous sanction of the authorities.

It is possible for you to prevent this raid, as it has been playfully and mischievously called, in three ways: by removing the salt tax; by arresting me and
my party unless the country can, as I hope it will, replace every one taken away; by sheer goondaism, unless every head broken is replaced, as I hope it will.

(Tendulkar 1951–54, vol. 3: 36)

Gandhi does not tell in whose name he would demand possession of the salt works or from whom he could expect to get a concession at the site of the salt works.

Gandhi was arrested, and leadership was transferred, first to Mr. Abbas Tyabji, then to Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. Let us quote from the narrative by Tendulkar, one of the most careful writers on the subject:

On May 21st over 2,000 volunteers led by her [Mrs. Naidu] and Imam Saheb raided Dharasana salt depot, about 150 miles north to Bombay. Mrs. Naidu led the volunteers in prayer and addressed them briefly: “Gandhiji’s body is in jail, but his soul is with you. India’s prestige is now in your hands. You must not resist, you must not even raise a hand to ward off blows.” With Manilal, Gandhi’s son, in the forefront, the throng moved forward towards the salt pans, which were now surrounded by four hundred Surat Police with half a dozen British officials in command. The police carried big lathis, five-foot clubs tipped with steel. Inside the stockade twenty-five riflemen stood ready.

(Ibid., p. 40)

We all know how things developed. There was bloodshed on a large scale. An American journalist named Miller, who visited a temporary hospital, counted 320 injured, many still insensible with fractured skulls, and others writhing in agony from kicks in the testicles and stomach. The same journalist has an interesting piece of commentary from the battlefield itself:

Group after group walked forward, sat down, and submitted to being beaten into insensibility without raising an arm to put off the blows. Finally the policemen became enraged by the non-resistance, sharing, I suppose, the helpless rage I had felt at the demonstrators for not fighting back. They commenced savagely kicking the seated men in the abdomen and testicles. The injured men writhed and squealed in agony, which seemed to inflame the fury of the police, and the crowd almost broke away from their leaders.

(Ibid., pp. 40–41)

Before I comment on this, it should be mentioned that already in April a “large quantity of contraband salt was forcibly seized”; “later a large quantity was sold or distributed in the village of Dandi” (ibid., p. 32). Later, salt
was carried away—in Wadala, “sackfuls”; in Karnatak, “thousands of mounds of salt” (ibid., p. 41). One must presume that the briefing of the police before the clash with the raiders at Dharasana included a justified prediction that they would take away salt.

Now, if there is any situation in which policemen feel completely justified in stopping people with forcible means, it is where they are trying to steal private or public property. When salt is forcibly seized, policemen tend to believe it is stolen, and they act accordingly if not convinced by outsiders that what is going on is not theft.

The policemen at Dharasana must have looked on the campaigners as raiders, as private citizens trying to get hold of large quantities of salt. It is quite a different thing to try to stop people from making their own small quantity of salt out of seawater or to demonstrate for the right to do so.

Our conclusion is therefore that the preliminaries before taking up direct action were not taken care of in the salt raids of May and June 1930. The campaigners provoked and invited violence from their opponents (cf. N8, p. 74).

When the police find themselves justified in brutal beatings, and their opponents do not stop their direct action, the effect may well be as the journalist Miller described it: the police become more enraged and lose control over themselves. This effect is the opposite of that intended by satyagraha. The opponent must not be made to debase himself, to lose face. And one must renounce the propaganda value of displaying police and others who have lost control over themselves or are committing atrocities.

The salt raids were inconsistent with the satyagraha norms in several respects: on meeting the opponent, in this case the guardians of the salt depots, there was no sustained effort to communicate with them. If it is argued that the real opponent was the viceroy and other high officials, a distinction then becomes highly relevant—between direct and indirect, near and remote opponents. Gandhi worked by personal contact, and during a direct action, it is always the near, not the remote, opponent who is to be met and persuaded.

The leader, Mrs. Naidu, asserted, as if it were already a fact, that the campaigners would be clubbed down. Therefore, no effort to communicate could reasonably be made as part of the campaign action. Perhaps it was not practically possible? The available sources do not discuss the point.
Further, it may be argued that the objective of the action was not properly defined. What was “to take possession” to mean? What was the relation between a law forbidding the manufacturing of salt to an action by which possession of already manufactured salt is proclaimed?

The objective of the action was at least not justified explicitly, it seems. The characterization (used by Tendulkar, Fischer, Bondurant, and others) of the action as a raid was unbiased, but not the phrase used by Gandhi when saying that the action had been “playfully and mischievously” called a raid. There is no clear indication that the action was not properly called a raid, and raids are certainly not 100 percent pure satyagraha.

The actions themselves included important features in addition to the proclaimed objective: salt was removed and transported to unknown places, sometimes in great quantities. This exemplifies a breach of N25 (“During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its goal wider or narrower”). Does taking possession include transportation and distribution? It seems that if there was a plan for how to use the salt or operate the works, the opponent ought to know about it. In a future nonviolent society, distribution and use of salt will have to be regulated somehow. The raid did not picture an ideal future situation.

Are we then forced to conclude from the foregoing that the so-called salt raids in 1930 do not exemplify satyagraha? Not quite. First of all, the available historical sources are incomplete. Further, there is a wide margin of uncertainty regarding what might have been done but was not done, or what was done but did not work.

Second, the confrontation of an actual campaign with a systematization containing 25 norms can reasonably only have the aim of finding out how far and in what features the campaign differs from a campaign satisfying to an ideal degree all the norms. It would be unreasonable and unjust to limit the designation satyagraha to campaigns completely satisfying all the norms. In such a case, Gandhi would not have carried through a single satyagraha campaign. “I know what an inadequate follower I am of myself, for I cannot live up to the convictions I stand for” (Bose 1957: viii).

Conclusion

A confrontation of the New Violence with Gandhian nonviolence reveals similarities. Some key phrases:
1. Extreme activism.
2. Impatience: result now!
4. If you lack self-respect, retaliate rather than submit to insults.
5. Make plans for parallel business and institutions.
6. Suppression, exploitation, and manipulation are forms of violence.

But there are also deep divergences:

1. Short-term physical and verbal violence may reduce long-term violence.
   (Rejected by Gandhi, accepted by New Violence)
2. Fight antagonisms, not antagonists.
   (Accepted by Gandhi, in part rejected by New Violence)
3. Hate suppression, not suppressors.
   (Accepted by Gandhi, largely rejected by New Violence)
4. There are always basic interests in common.
   (Accepted by Gandhi, rejected by New Violence)
5. First destroy all that is bad, then start building.
   (Rejected by Gandhi, accepted by some New Violence leaders)

The outlook for the future is in some respect encouraging from the point of view of Gandhian thinking. The T.C.B. slogan of New Violence indicates a resolve to build up parallel institutions and furnish a constructive program.