

III

Norms and Hypotheses of Gandhian Ethics and Strategy of Group Struggle

Introductory Remarks

Aim of the Systematization

Any normative, systematic ethics containing a perfectly general norm against violence will be called an ethics of nonviolence. The content will show variation according to the kind of concept of violence adopted. In order to do justice to the thinking of Gandhi, the term *violence* must be viewed broadly. It must cover not only open, physical violence but also the injury and psychic terror present when people are subjugated, repressed, coerced, and exploited. Further, it must clearly encompass all those sorts of exploitation that indirectly have personal repercussions that limit the self-realization of others.

The corresponding negative term *nonviolence* must be viewed very narrowly. It is not enough to abstain from physical violence, not enough to behave peacefully.

In what follows, we offer a condensed systematic account of the positive ethics and strategy of group struggle, trying to crystallize and make explicit the essentials. We use the adjective *positive*, because the systematization does not include a treatment of evils, for instance, a classification into greater and less great evils. (Whereas violence is always an evil, it is sometimes a greater evil to run away from responsibility.)

According to Gandhi's ethics, explicitness is a duty. His politically relevant actions were innumerable, and he offered running commentary on them, factually as well as in terms of ethical appraisals. Few politicians have talked so much on the metalevel. Furthermore, because he never worked behind closed doors, there were always witnesses. We are spared the feeling

that the most important decisions, the most important statements of policy, were worked out in secret sessions.

The resulting vast material makes it practicable to work out broad interrelated groups of sentences representing rational reconstructions or models covering Gandhi's politically and ethically relevant behavior and attitudes.

The primary sources for this kind of reconstruction are historical documents and other materials concerning Gandhi's activities, his own systematic writings, his correspondence, and the conversations and speeches. They were recorded or summarized by D. G. Tendulkar, Shri Pyarelal, Mahadev Desai, and others. Much of this material has already been printed and is easily available.

If we were to mention a publication of particular value for rational reconstructions, I should choose the first volume of Gandhi's *Non-violence in Peace and War* (1942, 1944) edited by Desai, one of his distinguished companions. It includes not only a variety of newspaper articles and letters, but also recordings of conversations. They are all dated, and most of them refer to well-known political actions going on at the time. The concrete nature of the problems at issue does not reduce the philosophical value of the material. On the contrary, the interpretation of professional philosophers' ethical texts is usually hindered by an almost complete lack of reference to application in concrete situations. This is true of Plato, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and others. Without abundant application to concrete, historically well-known situations, ethical doctrines are impenetrable to analysis.

Of the many compilations of quotations from Gandhi, the enlarged edition of *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi* (1967), edited by R. K. Prabhu and U. R. Rao, is outstanding. Unhappily, those extremely important sources from which we have already drawn, Gandhi's periodicals *Young India* and *Harijan*, are practically unavailable. References to these must therefore, in many cases, be supplemented by supporting references to the compilations.

In the following, one particular version, *E*, of one particular rational reconstruction of Gandhi's ethics is outlined in the form of a normative system. The system belongs to the class of systems that outline, structure, reflect, or portray not all Gandhian thought but primarily Gandhi's ethics of group struggle between 1907 and 1934. After 1934, political life in India becomes increasingly complicated, making it more difficult for Gandhi to apply his ideas in a simple, surveyable, unambiguous way.

Concerning the adequacy of Systematization *E*, the following should be added: The norms N_1 through N_{25} and most of the hypotheses are selected on the basis of a survey of norms and hypotheses in Gandhi's writings and the interpretation of his actions in campaigns. Some of our formulations are close to those of Gandhi; others are only indirectly or in part derived from him. Our main concern has been to ensure that all norms¹ of group ethics necessary to justify and explain *satyāgraha* (as described by Gandhi) are included in N_1 through N_{25} , and that no norm is contrary to the spirit of the formulations found in Gandhi's texts.² Thus completeness or comprehensiveness has ranked high in our choice of Systematization *E* among many different versions. Unhappily, the wideness of the perspective has necessitated a relatively high level of abstractness. For concrete applications that elucidate the abstract norms and hypotheses, one must consult the relevant sections in chapter 4.

The ethics of group struggle is conceived as a component of ethics in general, but with some degree of independence: the total set of its norms is derived from a very small number of norms, ultimately only one, which concerns group struggle in general. The dependence on general ethics is structurally shown by the derivation of a basic norm concerning group struggle from norms of other parts of ethics.

The dependence is also clear from the fact that some of the norms of the particular version of the ethics of group struggle outlined in what follows can be derived from norms of other parts of ethics by processes of inference that circumvent the basic norm of the ethics of group struggle. Thus, norm N_8 , "Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent," is derived from norm N_{14} and hypothesis H_9 , that is, from "If you are not able to subsume any of a group of relevant actions or attitudes as in themselves violent or constructive, then choose that action or attitude that most probably reduces the tendency to violence in the participants in the struggle" and "You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating and provoking him." However, norm N_8 might also be derived from a general code of conduct concerning behavior toward others, whether or not a struggle is imminent. The possibility of such circumventions is not, of course, very alarming. The historical data permit different explications of the relation between general ethics and the ethics of group struggle.

In what follows, we ignore directives as to how to fight for a bad cause—for instance, for an increase of violence—and assume tacitly that

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the goal for a struggle is acceptable from the point of view of Gandhi's ethics as a whole. This assumption is used in relation to all hypotheses and norms of Systematization *E. The acceptance of the assumption is important because otherwise one cannot assume, as in H_2 , that there is an incompatibility between goal-directed motivation and destructive, violent tendencies. Destructive means are often good for destructive goals!

A systematization of Gandhi's ethics of group struggle with only one basic general norm appears to make all more specific norms instrumental and to rob all values, except those defined by the basic general norm, of their status as intrinsic values. Thus, if all more specific values are derived, then the only intrinsic good will be the realization of the basic general norm; all other values are instrumental. If all this is a fair interpretation of a pyramidal systematization, then we have arrived at a utilitarianism more comprehensive than that of, for instance, Fanon (see here on pp. 98 ff.), but a utilitarianism nevertheless.

This interpretation, however, is grossly misleading. "Universal self-realization" is not an object *in addition to* specific steps of self-realization at a definite time in a definite situation. The postulation or hypostatization of such an object would express a crude conceptual realism that is squarely incompatible with the function of systematizations. Further, the individual acts of seeking truth do not serve as instruments by which one creates something different from these acts, namely, "truth seeking in general." Thus individual steps toward self-realization and acts of truth seeking cannot without misapprehension be termed useful for universal self-realization and seeking of truth. The pyramid of norms and hypotheses is not one quality or value. The good attained by following a norm at the lowest level is not a good of the lowest kind, a slight and unimportant good. Levels of derivation do not correspond to levels of goodness or value or quality. Derivation depends on generality, not quality. A low value is not "derived" from a high value, a low norm is not derived from a high and more respectable norm.

Action is always specific and singular, therefore no norm can be followed if it is not specific enough to enlighten us about how to act in concrete situations. The lower levels of the pyramid are levels with increasingly specific norms and hypotheses. From "Act so as to minimize violence on this planet" nothing follows when one is in doubt about an act of sabo-

tage. A high place in the pyramid, taken in isolation, is on the whole an indication of lack of usefulness in practice.

Our conclusion: The relation of values defined by lower level norms to those defined by higher ones is not one of usefulness but one of derivation. Thus, this relation of values is not utilitarian in the sense of mere usefulness.

The Particular Norms and Hypotheses

A norm is said to be on level k , $k > 1$, if it is directly derived from a norm of level $k-1$. This is said to be so even if the derivation also requires acceptance of some hypotheses. A hypothesis is said to be of level k if it is used in the derivation of a norm of level k .

First and Second Levels

From “Act so as to reduce and eliminate violence,” $*N_3$ of the meta-physical systematization, we derive the level one or fundamental “norm of nonviolence in group struggle”:

$N_1 \equiv$ Act in group struggle and act, moreover, as an autonomous person in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence.

The derivation of N_1 from the basic general norms of self-realization and a hypothesis concerning the ultimateness of life permits us to picture the ethics of group struggle as an application of that norm to particular situations.

It should be noted that N_1 is not characteristic of consistent pacifist positions since it may, for instance, be argued without violating N_1 that killing in group struggle may be more conducive to the long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence than not killing. We shall comment on the relation to pacifism later.

Sentence N_1 is intended to express the top norm of the system. All other norms are conceived to be derivable from this norm + hypotheses. The normative power of such pyramidal systems rests with N_1 and N_1 alone.

By there being only one top norm, dependence on the metaphysical position is reduced and made clear and simple. All derivations go through one checkpoint. On the other hand, some norms and hypotheses of Systematization *E* might, as we have already suggested, more naturally and comprehensively be derived from norms and hypotheses of the metaphysical position than from the exhortation to reduce violence in group struggle. The relative independence of the systematization from the details of a metaphysical view is, however, a decisive advantage, and it also makes it easier for others to substitute a different metaphysics from ours, retaining the basic norm of the group struggle system.

The *derivability* of all norms from a single norm does not imply that the top one has any higher normative status. Derivability is not of ethical import. Nor does the derivability of a norm mean that the realization of the norm does not represent a good in itself or an intrinsic value. "Make A. Smith happy" is derivable from "Make all Smiths happy," but this does not imply that it lacks intrinsic value to make A. Smith happy.

Instead of using the phrase "hypotheses and norms of the system," we could also employ the phrase "descriptions and prescriptions." The term *hypothesis* is used because it suggests what we wish to emphasize—the empirical, a posteriori character of the statements—and because we want by our terminology to constantly suggest the possibility and relevance of research programs revising norms and to reflect changes in political and social settings. Since all norms of the system except N_1 are prescribed under the condition that certain hypotheses are true, the whole system, except the single top norm N_1 , is, in principle, open to scrutiny from the point of view of empirical research. That is, the validity of every single statement of the ethics of group struggle depends on the truth and tenability of a set of empirical hypotheses. Gandhi looked on his life as one of *experimentation* with nonviolence.

It so happens that most of the hypotheses are at the moment to some extent testable by the techniques of the social sciences. Or, to be more modest: if the formulations of the hypotheses are made more precise by making use of the terminology dominant in social science today, we can find for each of our hypotheses at least one reformulation that expresses a scientifically testable working hypothesis.

The largely impersonal top norm N_1 is preferred to a norm that simply states, "Do not use violence" because, among other things, it would be too

narrow. The top norm envisages a reduction of violence in complete generality, not only the reduction of one's own violence. It is a pivotal point in Gandhi's thinking. Who does the violence? is a secondary question. Gandhi demands not only personal abstention from violence, but a conduct that does not provoke violence on the part of the opponent or anyone else affected by our conduct. Thus we should not humiliate an opponent by certain kinds of passive resistance because this is likely to produce hatred, which, in turn, may strengthen his disposition toward future use of violence. Further, Gandhi asks for a society, "the nonviolent society," that minimizes the potential role of violence.

There is another important aspect of N_1 : it requires that we *act* in group struggles. Seek the center of troubles and do not run away from the area of conflict. Here the basic attitude of the *karmayogin* reveals itself: one cannot retreat to the solitude of the Himalayas in order to better follow N_1 , because nonviolence by mere isolation from others is not likely to induce nonviolent behavior in others. It is by personal interaction in conflict situations that we can best reduce violence. Further, it is only in difficult (mostly also disagreeable) situations that we can hope to increase our own power of nonviolence. The "benevolent" bystander living in a peaceful suburb may turn out to be a beast when at last he is tested in a fierce riot, whereas a seasoned soldier may keep control of himself and apply nonviolence at a high level.

$H_1 \equiv$ The character of the means used in a group struggle determines the character of the results.

The means-end philosophy of Gandhi and of most other thinkers who feel at home in the camp of nonviolence is important not only from a theoretical point of view, but also didactically. In dialogues carried out in conflict situations, adherents to nonviolence show systematically less confidence in devious ways of arriving at goals generally accepted as good. However, in part because of its central character, the means-end philosophy does not lend itself easily to any clear single expression.

Gandhi sometimes formulated his view on this point in a paradoxical and categorical way. For instance, he says: "Means and ends are convertible terms in my philosophy of life. . . . They say, 'means are after all means.' I

would say, ‘means are after all everything.’ As the means so the end” (*Young India* 26.12.1924: 424 and 17.7.1924: 236–37; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 226). Taken verbally, the convertibility leads to paradoxes. If a strike is carried out in complete nonviolence, it does not ipso facto constitute the end. The strike is a means to an end, for instance, food for hungry workers. However ethically formidable in its implementation, a strike does not produce food. Nor does it make sense to invert the process, making food for hungry workers a means for achieving a strike.

There are, happily, other formulations that are more clear. Gandhi has expressed his idea in this way: “The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree” (*Hind Swaraj* 1958: 71; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 226). Taken literally, this formulation also leads to paradoxical or at least strange and awkward conclusions. We have tried to circumvent such interpretations by saying in H_1 that the character of the means determines the character of the results. This is very vague or indefinite, but it helps when combined with certain additions that introduce a typology of means and that also relate this typology to a typology of results.

When an action is said to be a means toward an end, no complete characterization is, of course, given of the action. The logic of these words is similar to that of “cause” and “effect.”

Just as one and the same thing may be a cause in one relation and an effect in another, it may be a means in one and an end in another. There are chains of means and ends, just as in the case of causes and effects. (However, means do not *cause* the end.)

If, for example, what is designated by *means* is a definite raid and the end is political independence, there will nevertheless be a large number of actions that count as means in relation to that specific raid as their end. Think of preparations for the raid. Just as in the case of cause and effect, “means-end” is a relation that only takes care of the relata in respect to one single characteristic: the means-end relation.

This already precludes an adequate evaluation of an action that in a given case has a means-end relation to a given goal. Ends do not justify means, Gandhi asserts, just as motivation cannot justify actions—provided, of course, by *justify* we do mean something more than merely “contributing to a justification.”

If a *satyāgraha* campaign is a campaign consistent with the ethics of nonviolence, any action that forms part of that campaign must be consistent with that ethics. That requirement already makes it clear that violence cannot be part of (100 percent) pure *satyāgraha*. Thus, if an action is a violent means to an end, no characterization of the end is needed in order to conclude that it cannot be part of (100 percent) pure *satyāgraha*. What is usually gained in ethics of nonviolence by postulating that “means determines ends” or even “means are exchangeable with ends” can be more convincingly and clearly gained by insisting, first, that any end or means in a conflict be subordinate to the norms of nonviolent struggle—it is not enough that ends be confronted with the norms—and, second, that ends definable as features of nonviolent society be anticipated by nonviolent means insofar as they involve acting as though in a nonviolent society. Use of a great variety of such means involves taking up the form of life envisaged for a nonviolent society. However, as long as the end, strictly speaking, includes the nonviolent behavior of the opponents, the (complete) end is not realized before the struggle ends in complete victory. Therefore, means and ends are not exchangeable or synonymous (convertible) if we compare behavior during the application of the means with behavior once the end (victory for nonviolence) has been achieved.

If we take self-realization to be the ultimate goal (as in Systematization *E) and a nonviolent society to be a necessary condition for reaching supremely high levels of self-realization, then all nonultimate ends and all means must be judged in relation to self-realization and the nonviolent society.

For some important means M_i advocated by Gandhi, “genuine, strong use of the means M_i ” and “realizing the end E_i , in relation to which M_i is a means” are very near each other, perhaps extensionally identical. This holds well for the means *ahimsā* in relation to “seeing God face to face” or “knowing God to the extent of seeing Him face to face.” Gandhi says that for him, the only certain means of knowing God is nonviolence—love. However, it is clear from other places that if a person performs perfectly pure *ahimsā*, he ipso facto “sees God face to face.” Perfectly pure *ahimsā*, however, must be considered practically impossible, at least for an individual in a violent society, because it implies complete self-realization and this can only be achieved when others have been dragged out of their violent habits. (“My self-realization is coupled to the self-realization of others.”)

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$H_2 \equiv$ In a group struggle, you can keep the goal-directed motivation and the ability to work effectively for the realization of goals stronger than the destructive, violent tendencies and the tendencies to passiveness, despondency, or destruction only by making a constructive program part of your total campaign and by giving all phases of your struggle, as far as possible, a positive character.

By “struggle with a positive character” here is meant “struggle, some genuine parts of which show (concretely, perceptually) the desired end by partially anticipating it.” The struggle is, when positive, manifestly and evidently *for* something. Only by implication is the struggle against something. The constructive character is the manifest one; the destructive is implied. The violent opponent faces a state of affairs that shows him the desired end, not a group engaged in destruction or mere opposition against something not desired.

A quotation from Gandhi’s journal *Harijan* indicates how important he conceived the constructive program to be:

By hammering away at it through painful years, people have begun to see that there is a potency in non-violence, but they have not seen it in all its fulness and beauty. If they had responded to all the steps that had to be taken for the effective organization of non-violence and carried out in their fulness the various items of the eighteenfold constructive programme, our movement would have taken us to our goal. But today our minds are confused because our faith in constructive work is so weak. (*Harijan* 10.2.1946)

The goal alluded to in this quotation is “complete freedom (*pūrṇa svarāj*) for India,” that is, not only political independence from the British, but solution of the conflict between different religious communities (Hindus versus Muslims, Muslims versus Sikhs, etc.). The following quotation also illustrates the central position of the constructive programs:

Civil Disobedience, mass or individual, is an aid to constructive effort and is a full substitute for armed revolt. Training is necessary as well for civil disobedience as for armed revolt. Only the ways are different. Action in either case takes place only when occasion demands. Training for military revolt means learning the use of arms ending perhaps in the atomic bomb. For civil disobedience it means the Constructive Programme. (Gandhi 1945: 5)

$N_2 \equiv$ Make a constructive program part of your campaign.

N_2 is conceived as derivable from N_1 and H_2 . The special place of constructive programs in nonviolent struggles is further commented upon on pages 86 ff.

$H_3 \equiv$ Short-term violence counteracts long-term universal reduction of violence.

A violent man's activity is most visible, while it lasts. But it is always transitory . . . Hitler . . . Mussolini . . . and Stalin . . . are able to show the immediate effectiveness of violence. But it will be as transitory as that of Ghenghis' slaughter. But the effects of Buddha's non-violent action persist and are likely to grow with age. . . . [E]xperience convinces me that permanent good can never be the outcome of untruth and violence. Even if my belief is a fond delusion, it will be admitted that it is a fascinating delusion.

(Quoted in Pyarelal 1958, vol. 2: 802)

The qualification "long-term, universal" is used in order to provide a basis for the argument that, even if the short-term result of a war or a minor violent act may completely suppress a large-scale violence, the long-term effects of the use of violence result in more violence than was avoided as an immediate result.

I do not believe in armed risings. They are a remedy worse than the disease sought to be cured. They are a token of the spirit of revenge and impatience and anger. The method of violence cannot do good in the long run.

(*Young India* 9.6.1920: 3; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 139)

$N_3 \equiv$ Never resort to violence against your opponent.

Many people who favor war subscribe to N_1 . They conceive of war as a means to end all future wars or at least as a necessary evil on the way to ultimate reduction of violence. Norm N_3 goes against this and is conceived to be derivable from N_1 and H_3 .

Actually, no derivation is possible in any formal logical sense. Such derivation would require formalization of the system and the addition of a vast number of uninteresting premises that we have left out. Here we shall

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only offer a point of departure for explications with highly explicit logical relations. Remarks similar to this are called for in many other instances in the following discussion where the terms *derive* and *derivable* are used. They are not used in the narrow sense of formal logic.

If a group *A* exploits *B* and a person or a group *C* starts *satyāgraha* on behalf of *B*, the aim of *satyāgraha* must be a state of affairs desirable for *A*, *B*, and *C*. The ideal of *satyāgraha* is to leave only victors when the struggle is over. Gandhi appealed to the British to leave India (as rulers) also for their own sake, and he meant it! Exploitation also “exploits” the exploiter: his self-realization is damaged, as not only Gandhi would affirm, but also theorists like Georg Hegel, Karl Marx, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Slaveowners are slaves of their slave ownership. In an area where Hindus dominate Muslims, domination hurts both, just as in areas of the opposite relation of domination. Exploitation is a form of violence (see *Harijan* 1.9.1940: 271–72; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 264–66), but it is a mutual violence, the exploiters against the exploited and the exploited against the exploiters.

In N_3 and in many norms and hypotheses that follow, we use such expressions as “the opponent,” “those for which we apply *satyāgraha*,” and so on. These refer to the manifest struggle. At a deeper level, *satyāgraha* is undertaken on behalf of all participants in the struggle. This point has been largely overlooked among theoreticians.

Satyāgraha is therefore, strictly speaking, done on behalf of the exploiters as well as the exploited. The manifest opponents are the exploiters, but the obstacles, the weaknesses that must be overcome, belong to both groups. The weaknesses foster the antagonism.

$N_{4a} \equiv$ Choose that action or attitude that most probably
reduces the tendency toward violence of all parties
in a struggle.

This norm is conceived to be derived from N_1 as a specification of it. It is an auxiliary norm we use when deriving N_{13} from H_{13} ; it stresses a non-discriminating and comprehensive concern for all violence with which we might have contact. Outgroup violence is affected by our ingroup policies. Instead of N_3 , “Never resort to violence against your opponent,” we could have stated “Never resort to violence” or “Never do violence.” From $*N_1$,

“Seek complete self-realization,” and $*H_3$, “Violence against yourself precludes realizing your self,” follows “Do not resort to violence against yourself” (or we can derive this norm from $*N_1$ and $*H_5$). In giving N_3 the form we do, we are deliberately limiting ourselves to group struggle. In any case, the systematization admits a completely general norm against violence. Further, such a norm is not an instrumental norm; it is not utilitarian.

The systematization seems to present a utilitarian ethics of nonviolence because there is a supreme norm, “Seek complete self-realization,” above any norms against violence. However, this interpretation goes against the kind of derivation intended when deriving norms against violence from other norms, as explained on pages 57 f. The relation of nonviolence to self-realization is intrinsic (internal), not external. That is, a state of complete self-realization is intrinsically one of complete nonviolence. It is not like the relation between a strike and a resulting gain in foodstuffs for the workers. Analysis of the food cannot reveal the strike, in spite of the strike being used to achieve, and being instrumental in relation to, the improved state of nourishment. Analysis of a state of self-realization, however, reveals an absence of violence. Derivations in a normative system are not limited to external relations. On the contrary, the intrinsic relations are the normal ones. If this could not be taken for granted, the term *involvement explication* should be used instead of *derivation*. Self-realization involves nonviolence, according to Gandhi.

Nevertheless, Gandhi sometimes viewed nonviolence as of thoroughly instrumental value, or at least said things that might be thus interpreted, for example: “Nonviolence being a policy means that it can upon due notice be given up when it proves unsuccessful or ineffective” (Gandhi 1951b: 75).

$N_{4b} \equiv$ Never act as a mere functionary, a representative of an institution, or an underling, but always as an autonomous, fully responsible person.

The top norm, $*N_1$, “Seek complete self-realization,” involves realizing oneself as an autonomous, fully responsible person, and therefore also acting as such. Furthermore, $*N_2$, “Seek truth,” requires personal independence because truth is not a property or monopoly of any person or institution. Au-

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tonomy as opposed to heteronomy does not involve more than personal identity: one's own, not someone else's, inner voice is the ultimate source of direction.

The next norms, twelve in all, are derived from norms N_2 , N_3 , and N_{4a} with the aid of additional hypotheses, numbered H_4 through H_{17} . In order to facilitate the survey of the systematization as a whole, we shall proceed in a somewhat schematic way.

First-Level Norm:

N_1

Second-Level Norms and Hypotheses:

$H_1, H_2, H_3 \rightarrow$ the latter two derived from the former

$N_2 \rightarrow$ derived from N_1 and H_2

$N_3 \rightarrow$ derived from N_1 and H_3

$N_{4a} \rightarrow$ derived from N_1

$N_{4b} \rightarrow$ derived from N_1

Third-Level Hypotheses

We now proceed to the formulation of the third-level norms and hypotheses. As evidence of the Gandhian character of the latter, we shall sometimes interpolate one or more quotations from his writings, speeches, and dialogues. The weight of this evidence shows great variation from case to case. A more thorough documentation can be made by careful analysis of his campaigns.

The hypotheses of level 3 fall into four groups. The first have to do with securing constructivity and positivity (H_4, H_5, H_6, H_9); the second, with the securing of sympathetic understanding ($H_{10}, H_{11a}, H_{11b}, H_{12}, H_{13}, H_{16}$); the third, with the permanent possibility of convincing (H_{14}, H_{15}, H_{17}); and the fourth, with the role of common goals (H_7, H_8).

$H_4 \equiv$ You can give a struggle a constructive character only if you
conceive it and carry it through as a struggle in favor of human

beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists (positive struggle).

Antagonisms are defined structurally without specifying the function of particular persons. Where there are antagonisms, violence is already at hand as structural violence, or violence is to be expected.

$H_5 \equiv$ It increases your understanding of the conflict, of the participants, and of your own motivation to live together with the participants, especially with those for whom you primarily fight. The most adequate form for living together is that of engaging jointly in constructive work.

We use the qualification “primarily” in order not to create the misunderstanding that *satyāgraha* is carried out on behalf of only one of the contending groups.

$H_6 \equiv$ If you live together with those for whom you primarily struggle and do constructive work with them, this will create a natural basis for trust and confidence in you.

$H_7 \equiv$ All human beings have long-term interests in common (derivable from $*H_2$).

Development of the self toward maturity includes a process of widening interests and identifications. Therefore the self-realization of the mature self requires that of others. On the less metaphysical level, Gandhi stressed concrete, tangible common interests among groups in conflict. Hindus and Muslims, “touchables” and untouchables, landlords and peasants, capitalists and laborers.

I do not think there need be any clash between capital and labour. Each is dependent on the other.

(*Young India* 4.8.1927: 248; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 209)

The interdependence of conflict groups makes *satyāgraha*, not riots and police violence, the appropriate way of “fighting” it out. Such fighting may

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result in the radical change of existing institutions. The interdependence does not imply that the group structure is permanent.

[I]f both labour and capital have the gift of intelligence equally developed in them and have confidence in their capacity to secure a fair deal, each at the hands of the other, they would get to respect and appreciate each other as equal partners in a common enterprise. They need not regard each other as inherently irreconcilable antagonists. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 208)

$H_8 \equiv$ Cooperation on common goals reduces the chance that the actions and attitudes of participants in conflict will become violent.

$H_9 \equiv$ You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating or provoking him.

Thus, if as part of a boycott of a university or a shop, you lie down in the corridors so as to make it impossible for those seriously opposed to the boycott to avoid stepping on you, your opponent is humiliated. He may either refrain from entering the building for respectable ethical reasons or do it but with resentment and anger. He is not likely to be won to your case, but, on the contrary, he will be more willing to use and more able to justify extreme measures in the conflict, for instance, calling the police.

$H_{10} \equiv$ Thorough understanding of the relevant facts and factors increases the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign.

Gandhi devoted much of his time to acquiring a thorough knowledge of relevant circumstances before he acted. He warned his adherents against advocating their cause before they also deeply understood the different aspects of the problems involved.

$H_{11a} \equiv$ Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your case and the plans for your struggle reduce the chances both for a nonviolent realization of the goals and for the success of future struggles.

Rumor and loose talk played in India, just as they do in present-day conflicts, a fundamental role in fostering hatred of the antagonist or outgroup and complacency and righteousness in the ingroup. Organized violence depends on this incompleteness and distortion. "Truth is the first casualty in war," it is said; on the contrary its absence precedes war as a partial cause.

The classic kind of escalation can be seen in the following scenario: Muslim scolds Hindu boy who has stolen a cake; Hindus in next street tell about Hindu being beaten by Muslim; Hindu kicks Muslim, who denies the charge; Muslims in next street tell about the murder of a coreligionist; Muslims murder an innocent Hindu; . . . general riot.

$H_{11b} \equiv$ Secrecy reduces the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goals of your campaign.

The intention to keep certain plans, moves, motives, and objectives secret influences our behavior so that we cannot face our opponent openly (poker-face development). The intention and its implementation are also more easily revealed to the opponent than we are likely to believe. Our poker face alerts the opponent. Furthermore, once a secret is revealed, the opponent cannot know how many other secrets are kept, and a general suspicion poisons the communication channels.

On the other hand, if the opponent is in power, he may arrest all the leaders of a planned direct action. This stresses the need for democratic leadership, making it possible for a larger group to assume leadership.

The norm against secrecy is not a norm against refusal to give information that endangers the life of innocents.

$H_{12} \equiv$ You are less likely to take on a violent attitude if you make clearer to yourself the essential points in your cause and struggle.

A *satyāgraha* is not undertaken unless the fighters are convinced of the rightness of the cause. However, in an action, the direct confrontations are rarely with the most responsible opponents. More often, the direct confrontations are with subordinates of the opponents or with the police. In case of injury to material possessions, these possessions may belong to completely

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innocent people. During direct actions, the distance between the positive aim of the campaign or movement and the concrete moves and doings of the fighters is considerable. Clear perception of both the positive aim and this distance makes it less likely that violence ensues: the nonviolent fighters are aware how misdirected, how *mal placé* the violence would be. They are aware of the futility of violence.

The importance, for Gandhi, of distinguishing essentials from nonessentials also derives from his teaching that one should always be willing to compromise on nonessential matters (cf. *N*₂₂, p. 82).

$H_{13} \equiv$ Your opponent is less likely to use violent means the better he understands your conduct and your case.

One might object that Hitler and many other leaders of group struggle profited immensely from ignorance. Knowledge of Hitler's conduct was apt to make his opponents consider any means! Against this we must respond with the reminder that the "case" must be consistent with the ethics of nonviolence—if not, Gandhi does not claim that anything will be gained from conducting the struggle nonviolently.

On the whole, Gandhi would insist that we inform our opponent more completely than is customary, even in rather friendly disputes, and that we do this by open actions rather than by proclamations.

$H_{14} \equiv$ There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause is able to convince him ultimately (general convincibility).

In the application of the method of nonviolence, one must believe in the possibility of every person, however depraved, being reformed under humane and skilled treatment (*Harijan* 22.2.1942).

Gandhi tended to include any normal person in the intended field of validity of this hypothesis, interpreting "normal" widely enough to cover even Adolf Hitler. A person's capacity to convince the opponent may be inadequate, but it can be developed immensely.

Hitherto he [Hitler] and his likes have built upon their invariable experience that men yield to force. Unarmed men, women and children offering non-violent

resistance without any bitterness in them will be a novel experience for them. Who can dare say that it is not in their nature to respond to the higher and finer forces? They have the same soul that I have. . . .

(*Harijan* 15.10.1938: 290; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 149)

According to the metaphysics of Gandhi, all human beings, including Hitler, are ultimately one. It may be right, however, for a person to kill another. In the Third Reich, there were many situations of nonviolent helplessness in which Gandhi's norm to use violence rather than to surrender was applicable.

$H_{15} \equiv$ Mistrust stems from misjudgment, especially of the disposition of your opponent to answer trust with trust and mistrust with mistrust.

There are many examples in Gandhi's writings of this conception of trust and mistrust. His life likewise offers examples of the way he trusted people strongly opposed to him and the courage he thus proved. He repeatedly risked his own life by believing that he could trust his opponents when he met them personally. His "experiments" with trust were on the whole successful.

A grave question, however, is what to trust in the opponent. Sometimes one may press an opponent to promise something, but it would be quite unrealistic to expect him to keep the promise. Gandhi might say here that to trust a person does not mean to trust anything he says; it means to trust something in the opponent that listens to appeals and makes progress possible. The opposite, the mistrust of the whole person, is to give up any appeal.

$H_{16} \equiv$ The tendency to misjudge and misunderstand your opponent and his case in an unfavorable direction increases both his and your tendency to resort to violence.

When Gandhi arrived in Durban in 1897, people were enraged because of biased reports about his speeches in India concerning race discrimination in Durban and other places. He was severely attacked. Recovering, he gave a fair account of the incident, decreasing the chance of further violence. He was to experience similar verifications of his hypotheses during the next fifty years.

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$H_{17} \equiv$ You win conclusively when you turn your opponent into a believer and active supporter of your case.

Persistent communication with the perceptible aim of convincing the opponent makes chances of solving the conflict greater than does communication that manifests resignation as to the possibility of influencing the beliefs of the opponent. If this sounds improbable, our reluctance to accept the hypothesis may stem from thinking in terms of pure conflicts of interest. Gandhian strategy presupposes common aims that bridge such conflicts. In matters of divergent interest (not touching upon justice), the strategy requires compromise.

No effort has been made explicitly to derive some of the hypotheses from others. By suitable modifications, H_{15} and H_{17} might, for instance, be derived from H_{14} .

Third-Level Norms

The third-level norms deal with the same four classes of subjects as the hypotheses that are used in their derivation—in short, principles of constructivity, understanding, convincing, and common goals.

$N_5 \equiv$ Fight antagonisms, not antagonists: conceive of your struggle and carry it through as a positive struggle in *favor* of human beings and certain values (derived from N_2 and H_4).

The essence of nonviolence technique is that it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not the antagonists themselves. (*Harijan* 29.4.1939)

Nonviolence does not signify that man must not fight against the enemy, and by enemy is meant the evil which men do, not the human beings themselves.

My non-co-operation, though it is part of my creed, is a prelude to co-operation. My non-co-operation is with methods and systems, never with men.

(Prabhu and Rao 1967: 184)

It may be mentioned, as an example, that in the first part of his most famous campaign, Gandhi supported the people in making salt rather than instigating them to rise up against the empire salt producers and their fac-

tories. The desired situation was anticipated. One should fight the antagonism, not the antagonists.

$N_6 \equiv$ Live together with those for whom you struggle and do constructive work for them (derived from N_2 and H_5 or from N_4 and H_6).

Gandhi's experience in India covered hooliganism, riots, and many other kinds of violent disturbances. He did not have to deal with narcotics and gangs of rebellious youths. Studying the following quotations, the reader might have the typical social problems of the 1970s in mind. The main conclusion is that these problems can only be solved by large-scale mobilization of ordinary citizens, not by police action. The effort of the ordinary citizen to hire and pay a police army to solve problems he himself has created violates a number of Gandhian norms and hypotheses.

To quell riots non-violently, there must be true *abimsā* in one's heart, and *abimsā* that takes even the erring hooligan in its warm embrace. Such an attitude cannot be cultivated. It can only come as a prolonged and patient effort which must be made during peaceful times. The would-be member of a peace brigade should come into close touch and cultivate acquaintance with the so-called *goonda* (hooligan) element in his vicinity. He should know all and be known to all and win the hearts of all by his living and selfless service. No section should be regarded as too contemptible or mean to mix with. *Goondas* do not drop from the sky, nor do they spring from the earth like evil spirits. They are the product of social disorganization, and society therefore is responsible for their existence. (*Harijan* 15.9.1940; quoted in Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 345)

They should contact the criminals in their homes, win their confidence and trust by loving and selfless service, wean them from evil and unclean habits and help to rehabilitate them by teaching them honest ways of living.
(Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 127)

I am a Hindu, I must fraternize with the Mussulmans and the rest. In my dealings with them I may not make any distinction between my coreligionists and those who might belong to a different faith. I would seek opportunities to serve them without any feeling of fear or unnaturalness. . . . Similarly, to meet the menace of thieves and dacoits, he will need to go among, and cultivate friendly relations with, the communities from which the thieves and dacoits generally come.
(*Harijan* 21.7.1940)

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$N_7 \equiv$ Try to formulate the essential interests that you and your opponent have in common and try to establish a cooperation with your opponent on this basis (derived from N_2 and H_7 or from N_4 and H_7 and H_8).

Behind my non-co-operation there is always the keenest desire to co-operate on the slightest pretext even with the worst of opponents.

(Prabhu and Rao 1967: 183)

I would co-operate a thousand times with this Government to wean it from its career of crime, but I will not for a single moment cooperate with it to continue that career.

(Gandhi 1951b: 126)

$N_8 \equiv$ Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent (derived from N_3 or from N_4 and H_9).

When living and working together with opponents (and people on your own side), you provoke them if you try to impose your standards of conduct on them. "The golden rule of conduct," says Gandhi,

is mutual toleration, seeing that we will never all think alike and we shall always see Truth in fragment and from different angles of vision. Conscience is not the same thing for all. Whilst, therefore, it is a good guide for individual conduct, imposition of that conduct upon all will be an insufferable interference with everybody's freedom of conscience.

(*Young India* 23.9.1926: 334; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 420)

$N_9 \equiv$ Acquire the best possible understanding of the facts and factors relevant to the nonviolent realization of the goals of your cause (derived from N_4 and H_{10}).

In every branch of reform constant study giving one a mastery over one's subject is necessary. Ignorance is at the root of failures, partial or complete, of all reform movements whose merits are admitted. For every project masquerading under the name of reform is not necessarily worthy of being so designated.

(*Harijan* 24.4.1937; quoted in Bose 1948: 209)

$N_{10} \equiv$ Do your utmost to present unbiased descriptions, to be in full accordance with the truth when describing individuals, groups,

institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle
(derived from N_4 and H_{11a}).

In a fierce labor struggle, Gandhi attributed his success to the habit of correctness in details — factual truth:

Incorrect or misleading reports, therefore, . . . and their ire, instead of descending on me, would be sure to descend on the poor fear-stricken ryots and seriously hinder my search for the truth about the case.

In spite of these precautions the planters engineered against me a poisonous agitation. All sorts of falsehoods appeared in the press about my co-workers and myself. But my extreme cautiousness and my insistence on truth, even to the minutest detail, turned the edge of their sword.

(Gandhi 1948: 507)

On the other hand, there should be no soft-speaking when harsh truths must be communicated:

False notions of propriety or fear of wounding susceptibilities often deter people from saying what they mean and ultimately land them on shores of hypocrisy. But if non-violence of thought is to be evolved in individuals or societies or nations, truth has to be told, however harsh or unpopular it may appear to be for the moment. (*Harijan* 19.12.1936; quoted in Bose 1948: 151)

Of special importance is a close scrutiny of ingroup gossip. It is all too easy to form a pleasant but biased picture of the campaign when conversing with comrades. This is a main source of satisfactory relations between campaigners during inactivity. They tell each other nice things about the campaign that place the opponents in a ridiculous position. The ingroup feeling is supported by conformity and by falsity of the picture. However, interacting incorrectly with other groups and with the opponent may lead to false steps and undermine the success of the campaign. There are always warm, positive, nice things to be said that do not violate the norm of truthfulness.

N_{11a} \equiv Do not use secret plans or moves or keep objectives secret
(derived from N_4 and H_{11b}).

No secret organization, however big, could do any good. Secrecy aims at building a wall of protection round you. *Abimsā* disdains such protection. It

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functions in the open and in the face of odds, the heaviest conceivable. We have to organize for action a vast people that have been crushed under the heel of unspeakable tyranny for centuries. They cannot be organized by any other than open truthful means. I have grown up from youth to 76 years in abhorrence of secrecy. (*Harijan* 10.2.1946; quoted in Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 2–3)

I do not appreciate any underground activity. I know that millions cannot go underground. Millions need not. A select few may fancy that they will bring swaraj to the millions by secretly directing their activity. Will this not be spoon-feeding? Only open challenge and open activity is for all to follow. Real Swaraj *must* be felt by all—man, woman and child. To labour for that consummation is true revolution.

(*Harijan* 3.3.1946; quoted in Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 50)

According to Gandhi, not all people have at all times the right to know everything about anything. Thus, it may be our duty to keep away information or plainly refuse to give certain information. Such cases were frequent during riots. Hooligans have no right to an answer when asking for the whereabouts of people they intend to rob or kill.

There is another aspect of the duty sometimes not to tell the truth. Gandhi formulated the principle “A reformer cannot be an informer.” Speaking at Uruli about a nonviolent attitude toward criminals, he stated that for a *satyāgrahin* to go to the police in order to give information “would be gross betrayal of trust.” He is also reported to have “mentioned several instances of how he had refused to give information to the police, about persons who had been guilty of violence and came and confessed to him. No police officer could compel a *satyāgrahin* to give evidence against a person who had confessed to him” (*Harijan* 11.8.1946; quoted in Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 126–27). A *satyāgrahin* would never be guilty of a betrayal of trust.

$N_{11b} \equiv$ Withdraw the intended victim from the wrongdoer (derived from N_4).

This norm has wide applications under terror regimes. It is often difficult to avoid a conflict of norms: the keeping away of potential victims from a criminalized police may develop into a large project requiring detailed planning that must be kept secret.

The wording of N_{11b} is taken from an article by Gandhi in his *Harijan* (part of it was quoted on page 43).

N_{12} \equiv Announce your case and the goals of your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from nonessentials (derived from N_4 and H_{12} and H_{13}).

N_{13} \equiv Seek personal contact with your opponent and be available to him. Bring conflicting groups into personal contact (derived from N_4 and H_{13}).

The would-be member of a peace brigade should come into close touch and cultivate acquaintance with the so-called *goonda* (hooligan) element in his vicinity. He should know all and be known to all and win the hearts of all by his living and selfless service. No section should be regarded as too contemptible or mean to mix with. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 344)

Peace brigades have a special mission in riot areas: . . . Theirs will be the duty of seeking occasions for bringing warring communities together, carrying on peace propaganda, engaging in activities that would bring and keep them in touch with every single person, male or female, adult or child, in their parish or division. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 344)

Gandhi tried to come into personal contact with the British administrators and succeeded to an amazing degree. The graver the conflicts, the more intense was his effort to be in personal touch with the opponent.

Perhaps, however, Gandhi did not consistently make efforts to be in personal contact with the very shy and suspicious Jinnah, the Father of Pakistan. If that is the case, it was another mistake “of Himalayan dimensions,” judged from its consequences. It is difficult, however, to find the sources in studying the relation between Gandhi and Jinnah. One of its few students, S. K. Majumdar, has some painful things to point out:

Throughout 1937 and 1938, Jinnah tried his level best to come into personal contact with Gandhiji for the purpose of settling Congress-League disputes. But Gandhiji and the Congress High Command did not think it worth while to cultivate Jinnah’s good will. Feeling aggrieved . . . Jinnah became very bitter only when he found that his conciliatory overtures were contemptuously ignored. Until his self-respect was wounded, his speeches were never characterised by any bitterness, but . . . (Majumdar 1966: 159 and 160)

Some of the close collaborators of Gandhi in the 1940s say that it was impossible to penetrate Jinnah’s personal defenses. However, according to the hypotheses of *satyāgraha*, it must have been possible. Perhaps Gandhi did

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not feel strong enough in his nonviolent attitude toward Jinnah? He talked surprisingly little about the possibilities of personal contact.

$N_{14} \equiv$ Do not judge your opponent harder than yourself (derived from N_3 or from N_4 and H_{16}).

$N_{15} \equiv$ Trust your opponent (derived from N_4 , H_{14} , H_{15} , and H_{16}).

A Satyāgrahi bids good-bye to fear. He is therefore never afraid of trusting the opponent. Even if the opponent plays him false twenty times, the Satyāgrahi is ready to trust him for the twenty-first time, for an implicit trust in human nature is the very essence of his creed. (Gandhi 1950: 246)

$N_{16} \equiv$ Turn your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or exploit him (derived from N_1 , N_4 , H_{14} , and H_{17}).

The *satyāgrahi's* object is to convert, not to coerce, the wrong-doer. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 78)

But there is no such thing as compulsion in the scheme of non-violence. Reliance has to be placed upon ability to reach the intellect and the heart—the latter rather than the former. (*Harijan* 23.7.1938)

How can I, the champion of *ahimsā*, compel anyone to perform even a good act? Has not a well-known Englishman said that to make mistakes as a free man is better than being in bondage in order to avoid them? I believe in the truth of this. The reason is obvious. The mind of a man who remains good under compulsion cannot improve, in fact it worsens. And when compulsion is removed, all the defects well up to the surface with even greater force.—Moreover, no one should be a dictator.

(*Harijan* 29.9.1946; Gandhi 1949a, vol. 2: 138)

Despite much controversy about fasting as a coercive means, Gandhi persisted in the application of fasts. He considered them necessary companions of prayers.

My religion teaches me that, whenever there is distress which one cannot remove, one must fast and pray.

(*Young India* 25.9.1924: 319; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 34)

[T]here is no prayer without fasting, and there is no real fast without prayer.

(*Harijan* 16.2.1933: 2; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 35)

It is not to be denied that fasting can be really coercive. Such are fasts to attain a selfish object. . . . I would unhesitatingly advocate resistance of such undue influence. . . . (*Harijan* 9.9.1933: 5; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 36)

Coercion is taken to be a sort of violence and is therefore inconsistent with pure nonviolence. The questions of permissibility and avoidability of coercion have been debated. We shall discuss this issue separately.

Fourth-Level Hypotheses

A new set of hypotheses, together with norms N_8 , N_{10} , N_{14} , and N_{16} , will give rise to a last group of norms.

$H_{18} \equiv$ You provoke your opponent if you deliberately or carelessly destroy his property.

$H_{19} \equiv$ Adequate understanding of your opponent presupposes personal empathy.

Immediately we begin to think of things as our opponent thinks of them, we shall be able to do them full justice. I know that this requires a detached state of mind, and it is a state very difficult to reach. Nevertheless for a *satyāgrāhi* it is absolutely essential. Three-fourths of the miseries and misunderstandings of the world will disappear, if we step into the shoes of our adversaries and understand their standpoint. (Bose 1948: 186)

$H_{20} \equiv$ Avoiding misjudging and misunderstanding your opponent and his case requires understanding him and his case.

$H_{21} \equiv$ If you keep in mind your own fallibility and failures, you are less likely to exaggerate those of your opponent. Opponents are then less likely to be misjudged in an unfavorable way, and their case is also less likely to be underestimated intellectually or morally.

$H_{22} \equiv$ Every political action, your own included, is likely to be based, in part, on mistaken views and to be carried out in an imperfect way (universal imperfection).

$H_{23} \equiv$ You make it difficult for your opponent to turn and support your case if you are unwilling to compromise on nonessentials.

$H_{24} \equiv$ It furthers the conversion of your opponent if he understands that you are sincere.

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$H_{25} \equiv$ The best way of convincing your opponent of your sincerity is to make sacrifices for your cause.

The notion of sacrifice (and also suffering) in Gandhi's thought stems from the corresponding religious notion in the Baghavad Gita— consider the Sanskrit term *yajña* ("offer," "token of devotion"). In nonviolent group struggle, hardships undertaken with joy for the cause count as sacrifice. "*Yajna* is not *yajna* if one feels it to be burdensome or annoying" (from Gandhi 1957; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 230).

The use of the terms *sacrifice* and *suffering* to translate *yajña* will suggest masochism to many Western readers. Let us therefore take note of Gandhi's explanation:

Yajna means an act directed to the welfare of others, done without desiring any return for it, whether of a temporal or spiritual nature. "Act" here must be taken in its widest sense, and includes thought and word, as well as deed. "Others" embraces not only humanity, but all life. . . .

(from Gandhi 1957; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 228)

The best way to convince the opponent is to make sacrifices for the cause, but hardships undertaken in order to impress the opponent are not *yajña*, according to the above quotation.

$H_{26} \equiv$ During a campaign, change of its declared objective makes it difficult for opponents to trust your sincerity.

Gandhi has in mind the expansion of objectives at moments of weakness in the opponent and contraction when it seems that the strength of the opponent has been underrated.

Fourth-Level Norms

$N_{17} \equiv$ Do not destroy property belonging to your opponent (derived from N_8 and H_{18}).

I see neither bravery nor sacrifice in destroying life or property for offence or defence. I would far rather leave, if I must, my crops and homestead for the enemy to use than destroy them for the sake of preventing their use by him. There is reason, sacrifice and even bravery in so leaving my homestead and

crops, if I do so not out of fear but because I refuse to regard anyone as my enemy — that is, out of a humanitarian motive. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 388)

$N_{18} \equiv$ Cultivate personal *Einfühlung* (empathy) with your opponent
(derived from N_{14} and H_{19} and H_{20}).

By *Einfühlung*, we here think of placing oneself as much as possible in the situation of the opponent and understanding his actions in that context rather than one's own. It depends on the ability and willingness to identify with fellow humans, whatever their relation to one's own private interests. It does not, of course, preclude an intensive fight against the position of the opponent in the conflict. Gandhi's talk on the day after the unsuccessful attempt on his life (January 20, 1948), furnishes an example of how well he succeeded in his cultivation of personal *Einfühlung* with the opponent and of his consequent high level of unbiasedness. Tendulkar reports on this event:

God only knew how he would have behaved in front of a bomb aimed at him and exploding. Therefore, he deserved no praise. He would deserve a certificate only if he fell as a result of such an explosion, and yet retained a smile on his face and no malice against the doer. What he wanted to convey was that no one should look down upon the misguided young man who had thrown the bomb. [The youth] probably looked upon the speaker as an enemy of Hinduism. After all, had not the Gita said that whenever there was an evil-minded person damaging religion, God sent some one to put an end to his life? That celebrated verse had a special meaning. The youth should realize that those who differed from him were not necessarily evil. The evil had no life apart from the toleration of good people. (Tendulkar 1951–54, vol. 8: 331–32)

Gandhi knew that the people trying to take his life were devout Hindus. The one who succeeded (January 30) knew the Bhagavad Gita practically by heart, and the reference to the Bhagavad Gita in the above example must be said to make the opponent's view stand out in its full strength. That Gandhi was a kind of tyrant, that his followers were charmed and awed, not convinced by reason and sentiment, was a conviction held by a considerable minority. Among the leaders, Jinnah was of that opinion, and to one with a different philosophy of means and ends, it might easily be considered a virtue to get rid of Gandhi. The quotation ends with the metaphysical point that evil does not exist as such, but only insofar as it is tolerated by ordinary "good" people. This is a point taken up by many West-

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ern philosophers, for example, Spinoza, and springs from the metaphysical conception of reality as something beyond good and evil.

$N_{19} \equiv$ Do not formulate your case, the goals of your campaign, or those of your opponent in a biased way (derived from N_{10} or from N_{14} and H_{20}).

$N_{20} \equiv$ Try to correct bias in your opponent only insofar as it is necessary for the campaign (derived from N_{10} or from N_{14} and H_{20}).

If your opponent describes your case in a biased way, this is not sufficient reason for you to use your time to try to correct him. If the misrepresentation is clearly relevant for the conduct and success of the campaign, an effort to change his presentation is advisable.

I am used to misrepresentation all my life. It is the lot of every public worker. He has to have a tough hide. Life would be burdensome if every misrepresentation had to be answered and cleared. It is a rule of life with me never to explain misrepresentations except when the cause requires correction. This rule has saved much time and worry. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 7–8)

$N_{21} \equiv$ Keep in mind and admit your own factual and normative mistakes, and look for opportunities to correct your judgments (derived from N_{14} and H_{21}).

$N_{22} \equiv$ Always be willing to compromise on nonessentials (derived from N_{16} and H_{22} and H_{23}).

I am essentially a man of compromise, because I am never sure that I am right. (Fischer 1943: 102)

[F]ull surrender of non-essentials is a condition precedent to accession of internal strength to defend the essential by dying. (*Harijan* 10.11.1940: 333; quoted in Dhawan 1951: 129)

A Satyāgrahi never misses, can never miss, a chance of compromise on honourable terms, it being always assumed that, in the event of failure, he is ever ready to offer battle. He needs no previous preparation, his cards are always on the table. (Prabhu and Rao 1967: 172)

Indeed life is made of such compromises. *Abimsā* simply because it is purest, unselfish love, often demands such compromises. The conditions are impera-

tive. There should be no self in one's action, no fear, no untruth, and it must be in furtherance of the cause of *abimṣā*. The compromise must be natural to oneself, not imposed from without. (Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 126–27)

All my life through, the very insistence on truth has taught me to appreciate the beauty of compromise. I saw in later life, that this was an essential part of *satyāgraha*. It has often meant endangering my life and incurring the displeasure of friends. But truth is hard as adamant and tender as a blossom.

Human life is a series of compromises, and it is not always easy to achieve in practice what one has found to be true in theory.

There are eternal principles which admit of no compromise, and one must be prepared to lay down one's life in the practice of them.

(Prabhu and Rao 1967: 39)

$N_{23} \equiv$ Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent
(derived from N_{16} and H_{24}).

This highly characteristic norm is commented on below (pp. 87 f.).

$N_{24} \equiv$ Be willing to make sacrifices and suffer for your cause (derived
from N_{16} and H_{24} and H_{25}).

In passive resistance there is always present an idea of harassing the other party and there is a simultaneous readiness to undergo any hardships entailed upon us by such activity; while in *satyāgraha* there is not the remotest idea of injuring the opponent. *Satyāgraha* postulates the conquest of the adversary by suffering in one's own person. (Bose 1948: 185)

Self-sacrifice of one innocent man is a million times more potent than the sacrifice of a million men who die in the act of killing others. The willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful retort to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God or man.

(*Young India* 12.2.1925: 60; quoted in Prabhu and Rao 1967: 139)

Gandhi has made it clear that the suffering, that is, the hardship, must be functional. He was not in favor of martyrs or sufferings not caused by acts conducive to the solution of the present conflict or future potential conflicts.

$N_{25} \equiv$ During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its
goals wider or narrower (derived from N_{16} and H_{24} and H_{26}).

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In a pure fight the fighters would never go beyond the objective fixed when the fight began even if they received an accession to their strength in the course of the fighting, and on the other hand they could not give up their objective if they found their strength dwindling away.

(Gandhi 1950: 422–23)

I distinctly said, that it would be dishonest now, having the opportunity, to take up a position which was not in view when *Satyāgraha* was started. No matter how strong we were, the present struggle must close when the demands for which it was commenced were accepted. I am confident, that if we had not adhered to this principle, instead of winning, we would not only have lost all along the line, but also forfeited the sympathy which had been enlisted in our favour. On the other hand if the adversary himself creates new difficulties for us while the struggle is in progress, they become automatically included in it. A *Satyāgrahi* without being false to his faith, cannot disregard new difficulties which confront him while he is pursuing his own course.

(Ibid., pp. 209–10)

For the proper use of this norm, we shall distinguish between action, campaign, and movement: Gandhi planned and carried out a number of campaigns for political independence of India and also a number of campaigns for other large goals, for example, the abolition of untouchability and mutual tolerance and respect between religious communities. The always well defined and limited campaigns are thus parts of larger, sometimes more ill defined, diffuse movements with supreme goals. The latter are in general not liable to precise delimitation. *Svarāj* was never defined or specified, leaving each group some freedom of interpretation. “Communal peace” was even less definite. Norms pertaining to campaigns are therefore not automatically generalized to movements. If the two are not kept apart, we are apt to require too much of movements and too little of campaigns. Within campaigns, we may speak of direct actions. Thus, the salt march might be taken as one action and the salt raids as other actions within the “abolish the salt monopoly” campaign. This example, however, is a difficult one, as it appears to suggest that the borderline between action, campaigns, and movement cannot be defined precisely.

Norm N_{25} says essentially that the opponent must get an honest answer to “What do you want through your present action?” and that if we achieve what we have said we want, then that action is to be terminated, whether its termination is opportune or not.

Elaboration and Exemplification

Constructive Programs

In this section, we shall illustrate how the above meager outline of a systematization can be taken as a starting point for a more substantial presentation. First, we shall elaborate on one of the norms of the system, N_2 , "Make a constructive program part of your campaign," in order to make it more understandable and also more open to critical examination. The paramount importance of this norm stems in part from Gandhi's conviction that if it is ignored by some sections of the supporters of *satyāgraha*, the strongest non-violent methods in the fight for political freedom are rendered inapplicable. Only those who are able to take upon themselves the task of constructive community service are sufficiently mature for intense massive nonviolent struggle. At a critical juncture in 1930, Gandhi stressed that he could not recommend civil disobedience campaigns because the requirement of a constructive program was unlikely to be fulfilled. Insufficient constructive content in the fight for freedom would make it overwhelmingly probable that there would be violence and that the people, even if victorious, would prove to be too immature for implementing radical reforms.

Gandhi was determined to stop a civil disobedience campaign in the case of such immaturity, as at Chaura Chauri, where some English policemen were murdered. However, only late in his life was he able to admit to himself how far behind he was in developing an institution of constructive work.

Gandhi insisted on constructive or positive conceptions of goals and subgoals and consequently demanded that Indians belonging to groups likely to get into violent conflict in case of crisis should work together on economic and other projects, thereby acquiring a spirit of mutual understanding and trust and a habit of sacrifice, that is, of engagement in the interest of wider long-range goals.

In India, such work was organized and planned under the name of the Constructive Program. The norms stating that one should contribute to the implementation of the constructive program make up an integral part of the Gandhian ethics of group struggle. They are not mere accessories.

A quotation will make the point clearer. In his statement of January 1930, Gandhi said among other things that the atmosphere was not conducive for initiating a mass civil disobedience campaign:

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Constructive programme is not essential for local civil disobedience for specific relief as in the case of Bardoli. Tangible common grievance restricted to a particular locality is enough. But for such an indefinable thing as Swaraj (freedom), people must have previous training in doing things of All-India interest. Trust begotten in the pursuit of continuous constructive work becomes a tremendous asset at the critical moment. Constructive work therefore is for a non-violent army what drilling etc., is for an army designed for bloody warfare. Individual civil disobedience among an unprepared people and by leaders not known to or trusted by them is of no avail, a mass civil disobedience is an impossibility. The more therefore the progress of the constructive programme, the greater is the chance for civil disobedience. Granted a perfectly non-violent atmosphere and a fulfilled constructive programme, I would undertake to lead a mass civil disobedience struggle to a successful issue in the space of a few months.

(*Young India* 9.1.1930)

In the booklet *Constructive Programme*, Gandhi even says that mass civil disobedience might be dispensed with if the constructive program were taken seriously by all concerned. He says:

Civil disobedience is not absolutely necessary to win freedom through purely non-violent efforts, if the cooperation of the whole nation is secured in the constructive programme. . . . My handling of civil disobedience without constructive programme will be like a paralysed hand attempting to lift a spoon.

(Diwakar 1946: 187)

Constructive work, on the other hand, cannot be dispensed with:

The best preparation for, and even the expression of, non-violence lies in the determined pursuit of the constructive programme. Any one who believes that without the backing of the constructive programme he will show non-violent strength when the testing time comes will fail miserably. It will be, like the attempt of a starving unarmed man to match his physical strength against a fully fed and panoplied soldier, foredoomed to failure.

(Gandhi 1944, vol. 1: 398–99)

The constructive work is of various kinds. A few of the many activities one might work to promote include eliminating untouchability, spreading hand-spun and handwoven cloth, developing village sanitation and other village industries, cultivating basic education through crafts, and creating literacy programs.

Gandhi also had in mind the effect on the opponent. In the eyes of the opponent, the revolutionary seems mainly to have destruction in view.

Gandhi requires methods whereby the constructive intent is made completely clear and trustworthy to the sceptical opponent.

As a demonstration against the British salt tax and salt monopoly, considered to be profoundly unjust, Gandhi and a mass of poor people marched to the sea to make salt illegally. While the campaign was going on, Gandhi used much time for other tasks, such as instigating house industry and cleaning up slum quarters. The latter activity was a genuine part of the campaign and part of the struggle for *svarāj* as a whole. It was a demonstration *ad oculos* that helped the followers and opponents fix their attention on the positive goals rather than on the means and the inevitable destructive components, that is, disabling the British administration.

One may say that the norm to partake in a constructive program is the supreme anti-antimovement norm in the system: those tendencies present in organizations or groups that favor the destruction of something (the organized anti-Semites, anti-Communists, anti-Fascists, etc.) are denounced; every action should have a clear, positive pro-character.

We have used the norm “Give your campaign a constructive content” to illustrate the rich, scarcely surveyable material that has to be studied in order to proceed from a mere diagram toward a full presentation of Gandhi’s political ethics. It should be clear from the comments and quotations that constructivity of main goals, constructivity of subgoals, and the so-called constructive program are means by which Gandhi tried to contribute to the implementation of many norms. It should also be clear that some norms may be viewed as occupying a lower position in relation to the norm requiring constructive work. Actually, the constructive work was a kind of partial anticipation of the condition Gandhi called *pūrṇa svarāj*, real independence, an ideal state of society. The political independence was not, as such, a constructive goal for him, since it was defined as *absence* of British domination.

Nonexploitation of Weakness

Let us elaborate on another norm, N_{23} , “Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent,” that is, insofar as the weakness is due to factors irrelevant to the struggle.

Victory in the sense of bringing the opponent to accept the stipulated conditions for terminating the *satyāgraha* is not necessarily a victory of the kind intended by the *satyāgrahin*. If the surrender is caused by some misfor-

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tune the opponent has experienced that makes it necessary for him to call off his struggle with the *satyāgrahin*, the opponent may, after the surrender, be as much opposed to the goal of the *satyāgraha* as before it all started. Surrender without conversion is not the ideal kind of termination of the struggle. If by factors irrelevant to the struggle and therefore unrelated to the conversion of the opponent, the *satyāgrahin* are able to get what they desire in terms of conditions, they should, if it is practicable, postpone the campaign until the opponent has recovered his full strength.

As an example, we may take what happened at the last stage of the *satyāgraha* campaigns in South Africa. Gandhi fought against certain laws that he considered discriminatory against the Indian minority. Their repeal was the condition of bringing the *satyāgraha* campaign to a stop. The Indian leaders were planning a march as part of the *satyāgraha*. When a railway strike broke out among the white employees, the government was in a dangerous position and might well have been willing to settle the conflict with the Indians in order to meet the situation created by the strike. Let me quote what Gandhi says in his narrative. Its reliability is not contested by his adversary — and great admirer — General Smuts. Gandhi said:

Just at this time there was a great strike of the European employees of the Union railways, which made the position of the Government extremely delicate. I was called upon to commence the Indian march at such a fortunate juncture. But I declared that the Indians could not thus assist the railway strikers, as they [the Indians] were not out to harass the Government, their struggle being entirely different and differently conceived. Even if we undertook the march, we would begin it at some other time when the railway trouble had ended. This decision of ours created a deep impression, and was cabled to England by Reuter. (Gandhi 1950: 325)

When World War II broke out, pressure was brought on Gandhi to intensify the fight against the British. He declined to take up mass civil disobedience during the war. He said:

There is neither warrant nor atmosphere for mass action. That would be naked embarrassment and a betrayal of nonviolence. . . . By causing embarrassment at this stage, the authorities must resent it bitterly, and are likely to act madly. It is worse than suicide to resort to violence that is embarrassment under the cover of nonviolence.

(Declaration published in all Indian newspapers, October 30, 1940)

Gandhi's argumentation and behavior in these two instances are in conformity with his admonition to not exploit weaknesses in our opponents' position (N_{23}).

Later, during World War II, Gandhi intended to start a mass movement. This plan creates a problem for our Systematization E . It requires either a hypothesis that the British then, in the autumn of 1942, were no longer in a temporarily weak position, or a decision that Gandhi violated his own norms, or perhaps a decision to modify our systematization so as to make Gandhi's behavior in both 1920 and 1942 conform to the explication of his ethics. We tentatively take the view that in 1942 Gandhi violated his own norms and are thus able to continue to regard the metaphysical Systematization $*E$ as adequate.

Coercion

Inherent in the concept of group struggle is an acknowledgment of a conflict of wills. "I do not want what you want, and I oppose you." When a *satyāgraha* campaign starts, a conflict of wills is taken for granted.

By definition, a successful *satyāgraha* campaign ends with wills in harmony (within the field covered by the always limited campaign). Normally, the direction of the wills of both parties is changed during the campaign. The antagonism disappears within a limited area without anyone being the victor. There is no vanquished and, therefore, no victor, but there is a victory. How this has happened is demonstrated in the history of *satyāgraha* campaigns; it is not our topic here.

If the parties had heard beforehand about the solution to be agreed on afterward, they would normally have rejected it as contrary to their will. Conceptually, this does not imply that the *satyāgraha* campaign forced a solution on the unwilling contestants. Coercion is not conceptually implied.

This conceptual discussion of volition and *satyāgraha* is important for its clarifying power in relation to the unfortunate acceptance by some researchers of coercion as a positive ingredient in a *satyāgraha* campaign. Thus, Joan Bondurant argues:

Coercion has been defined as "the use of either physical or intangible force to compel action contrary to the will or reasoned judgment of the individual or group subjected to such force." Despite the protestations of a few followers of

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Gandhi that satyāgraha is always persuasive and never coercive the method does contain a positive element of coercion. Non-cooperation, boycott, strike—all of these tools which may be used in satyāgraha involve an element of compulsion which may effect a change on the part of an opponent which initially was contrary to his will—and he may suffer from the indirect results of these actions. (Bondurant 1958: 9)

As a consequence of her stand at this point, Bondurant also thinks that ideal democracy, the non-coercive society as conceived by Gandhi, retains and therefore contains an element of coercion. “Dhawan errs,” Bondurant contends, when he suggests that Gandhi’s democracy would be “based on non-violence instead of coercion” (ibid., p. 173). As statements of principle not concerned with more or less unavoidable weaknesses in practice, these contentions are important.

Let us, for the sake of discussion, retain the definition of *coercion* by Paullin, adding the version suggested by Bondurant, “application of either physical or moral force to induce another to do something against his will” (ibid., p. 10; for the above-mentioned definition of *coercion* see Paullin 1944: 6).

Suppose person *P* wills *A* at time t_1 and *B* at time t_2 . Something has changed the direction of *P*’s will, and this could not have been his will itself (he neither willed to nor willed not to change his will!), but something foreign to his will. However, from this influence of something on the direction of *P*’s will, one cannot infer that *P* was coerced. Any change of opinion, for instance, may influence the direction. That *P* at time t_1 would have rejected a settlement *B* of a conflict that at time t_2 he accepted is not an indication that he was coerced into willing *B*. He may not have been coerced at all by any person in any respect during the interval t_2-t_1 . If he were *led* to acquire certain information or to receive certain impressions (perceptions) of suffering and these changed his reasoned judgment, we would not say he was coerced.

If the change of will follows a scrutiny of norms and hypotheses in a state of full mental and bodily powers, this is an act within the realm of personal freedom. *P* exercises his freedom of will—he changes his opinion under optimal conditions. The closing of ears and eyes and maximal obstinacy is not characteristic of a person with reasoned judgment. If a pure *satyāgraha* was required to end with a settlement that had already been agreeable to both parties at the beginning of the conflict, why ever start a

satyāgraha? Normally the ultimate formula agreed on after a *satyāgraha* campaign would not be agreeable—or even understandable—to the opponents before the *satyāgraha* was started.

Suppose, for a moment, that *M* carries *P* against his will into the streets where there is a riot and that as a consequence of what he sees, *P* changes some of his attitudes and opinions. Was the change coerced? We suggest that the change of *P*'s opinions or attitudes was not coerced, but that *P* himself was coerced into seeing something that caused the change. The distinction is relevant because *satyāgraha* is certainly incompatible with coerced changes of opinions or attitudes. Gandhi himself insisted on convincing, not coercing. "Coercion is inhuman" (*Harijan* 24.3.1946; Gandhi 1960: 238).

Even if changes of opinion or attitude are uncoerced, a *satyāgraha* may involve coercion: opponents may perhaps be forced or compelled to witness certain things or to hear certain arguments. However, coercion within a campaign decreases the degree of its consistency. It is characteristic that this anticoercive view of *satyāgraha* colors the excellent exposition by Bondurant in spite of her theoretical acceptance of coercion as a genuine element of *satyāgraha*:

In the instance of the Ahmedabad *satyāgraha*, Gandhi came to see that his fasting introduced an element of coercion which detracted from the true character of *satyāgraha*. The adherence to persuasion as opposed to coercion was best exemplified in the Vykom *satyāgraha*: after the State had withdrawn its support of the opposition and the roads had been legally opened to untouchables, the *satyāgrahis* did not take advantage of this development to enter the roads against the persisting opposition of the Brahmans. They continued the *satyāgraha* until they had persuaded their opponents that denial of passage to untouchables was morally indefensible. . . . In examining *satyāgraha* in action, it becomes clear that *satyāgraha* operates as a force to effect change.

(Bondurant 1958: 104)

Satyāgraha operates as a force to affect change—a keen force to affect deep changes. However, a force does not have to *force*. This makes *satyāgraha* possible. Where there is an element of forcing, of coercion, it is Gandhi's claim that the *satyāgrahin* by his or her training and outlook should be able to detect and get rid of it. He himself did not always succeed. Thus, in the fight against the position of certain mill owners, some of whom were his friends and therefore concerned about his health, Gandhi nevertheless initiated a fast:

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With the mill-owners, I could only plead; to fast against them would amount to coercion. Yet in spite of my knowledge that my fast was bound to put pressure upon them, as in fact it did, I felt I could not help it. The duty to undertake it seemed to me to be clear. (Gandhi 1948: 528)

The fast had other aims than to *make* the mill owners change their position. However, the negative side effect, the pressure put on these people, Gandhi thought he had to put into the bargain. The result was a *satyāgraha* of less than 100 percent purity, but this outcome does not undermine the position that *satyāgraha* may be carried through without such pressures.

If the above is acceptable, Dhawan's short characterization of Gandhi's conception of the ideal democracy may be adequate: a classless society "of autonomous village communities based on nonviolence instead of coercion, on service instead of exploitation, on renunciation instead of acquisitiveness and on the largest measure of local and individual initiative instead of centralization" (Dhawan 1946: 3).

Strict and Less Strict *Satyāgraha*

The foregoing system of norms formidably restricts the field of justifiable forms of conflict resolution. It is, however, the claim of the proponents of ethics of nonviolence that such a system omits no form of conflict resolution that is effective in the long run. It is presupposed that the goal is justifiable from the point of view of general ethics. It is claimed, therefore, that no effective (powerful, adequate) form is excluded for those who fight for an ethically acceptable cause.

The criteria of goodness offered by Gandhi and others are such that no statesmen today would openly reject them. That is, contemporary men in power would proclaim their goals to be good in the sense required. They claim justice, legitimate interest, and freedom as goals. (Whether their practice supports the claims is another question.)

Defining a maximally strict *satyāgraha* campaign as a group struggle completely fulfilling the norms of nonviolent group struggle (here represented by Systematization *E), we have an ideal that one cannot expect to be realized anywhere. However serious the intention of the leaders to realize the ideal struggle, one may expect that the situation sometimes at least momentarily gets out of control or that slight violations of at least one norm

simply “happen” in the heat of the struggle. Then there are circumstances under which even leaders with advanced nonviolent attitudes will deliberately violate one or more norms.

Let hundreds like me perish, but let truth prevail. Let us not reduce the standard of truth even by a hair's breadth for judging erring mortals like myself.
(Gandhi 1948: 7)

Gandhi stressed the importance of holding up an ideal of *ahimsā* even if we do not “practice that doctrine in its entirety” (see the quotation on page 44). The standards of nonviolence should not be lowered: “It would be wholly wrong for us to lower the standards of ahimsa because of our own frailty or lack of experience. Without true understanding of the ideal, we can never hope to reach it” (*Harijan* 28.4.1946). One might add that without adequate understanding of the maximum requirements or the ideal requirements, there will be inadequate understanding of the lesser requirements and the approximations.

A typology of violations must work with several dimensions: with the number of violations of each norm and the seriousness of the violence; with intentionality, i.e., the question of whether the leaders “should have foreseen the eventuality of this or that violation (at certain stages) and made precautionary measures” or their “degree of recklessness in hoping for the best”; and with the extent to which violations are due to non-belief in certain hypotheses.

Thus, we may believe in exceptions to H_{18} , “You provoke your opponent if you deliberately or carelessly destroy his property.” Destruction of instruments of mishandling or of weapons might in some cases be understood by the immediate opponent. Tiny pieces of technical installation could be destroyed in order to avoid great destruction of nature (dams).

More importantly, one might replace the term *violence* in N_1 (“Act in group struggle and act, moreover, as an autonomous person in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence”) with *injury*, and claim that the opponent is not always injured by physical violence. A man educated in the tradition of the Wild West may understand a left to the jaw much better than other forms of being shaken up. In riots, the use of fists against looters may have a good effect, some might maintain. In addition, many would claim that nonviolence left them altogether

helpless in the case of the rapid development of a riot or of some other great physical disturbance. Thus, very few would in practice believe in the empirical basis of N_3 , "Never to resort to violence against your opponent."

The multitude of forms of non-quite-strict *satyāgraha* campaigns make them unsuitable for systematic formulation. This is the basis for our strongest counterargument against those who think that the systematization of an absolutely strict *satyāgraha* is unimportant because of the unlikelihood of there being any case of its realization. It is considered too idealistic, remote, and moralizing. However, if we ask these "realists," What systematization do you favor, if any? there is such a diversity of answers, so much arbitrariness in the rules adapted to a reasonably realistic code, as to frustrate all efforts at systematization.

For example, the realist says that some sort of secrecy must sometimes be used. Yes, but how are we to make rules about it? Where are we to draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable secrecy within *satyāgraha*? The outcome of attempts to formulate rules tends to show that it is better to keep the formulations of the ideal *satyāgraha*, banning secrecy without qualifications, but to introduce somewhat narrow criteria of secrecy, making it different from merely not answering a question or not publishing a plan for direct action.

Take as an instance the important rule of nonviolence that says there is some piece of information that it is your duty to withhold. It cannot be your duty "to tell the truth" about the place where your children are hiding during a riot. The negation of " x tells the truth to y " is not " x tells something untrue to y ," but "it is not so that x tells the truth to y ." There is room for every thinkable behavior except one: *telling* the truth. Within that room, you have, for instance, the option of silence. However, in what cases does silence in such a context constitute dishonesty, untruthfulness, and therefore *himsā*? It seems clear that the protection of innocents against a wild mob, an execution unit of the SS, or any other group or individual set on murder more or less inevitably leads to infringements of some codes of nonviolence and that ethical assessment of the relative seriousness of the violations cannot be made on the basis of a systematization of nonviolence, if on the basis of systematization at all.

We are not, of course, arguing here that systematizations can solve a problem of ethical decision. In the last analysis, the acting person has to reaffirm his adherence to a rule before applying it, and this reaffirmation

does not have its sole justification in any rule. Otherwise, the individual retreats from his status as an individual person. There is no automatism in ethics! We may derive norms from other norms, but not ethically relevant decisions.

Mostly the argumentation against the systematization of pure nonviolent struggle is based on an absolutistic, methodologically naive conception of the aim of a systematization. Only close discussion of scientific methodology can help here. One must make oneself familiar with the peculiar aspect of the use of models and reconstructions, in short, with the *heuristics* of theory construction.

We know from physics, economics, and other sciences that concepts and theories may not fit anywhere but may nevertheless be fruitful. Thus, although the concepts of a vacuum, rigid bodies, economic man, free enterprise, and so forth, do not strictly apply anywhere, they have been useful as part of the scientific enterprise. However, that *part* must not be located incorrectly!

A thorough discussion of the role of systematization tends to conclude with agreement on a rather modest conception of systematization. Our adversary may then exclaim: "Is that all you are trying to do! How can you spend months or even years of your life on such modest aims?" This is a very understandable reaction, but a subsequent question put to the adversary about what *he* deems more rewarding tends to confirm the systematizer in his belief that he hasn't done so badly in his choice of occupation.